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This dissertation is composed of two related essays on the effects of periods of
large capital inflows on macroeconomic aggregates and financing constraints at the
firm level, and the relationship of the differences in these effects among developed
and emerging economies with the degree of financial development.
In the first essay I conduct an empirical exploration of this topic. I show that
periods of large capital inflow are associated with more volatile macroeconomic
outcomes in economies with a low degree of financial development, relative to
economies with more developed financial systems. Employing firm level data for
42 countries, I show that firms in economies with a low level of financial develop-
ment exhibit a relatively larger loosening in the cost of borrowing and a larger ap-
preciation in equity prices. I show that financing constraints are more prevalent in
firms located in countries with a low degree of financial development. Moreover,
periods of capital inflow booms relax these financing constraints. This decrease is
significant regardless of the composition of capital inflows, stronger when coupled
with domestic credit booms, larger for firms in the non-tradable sector and larger
for firms that depend more heavily on internal funds to finance their investment
opportunities.
In the second essay, using a theoretical model, I explain the larger aggregate
response around capital inflow booms, as arising from varying degrees of finan-
cial development, and their relation to the pervasiveness of credit constraints at
the firm level. I propose a heterogeneous agents model in which the share of
borrowing-constrained agents depends on the level of financial development. Agents
in an economy characterized by a low degree of financial development can use a
lower share of their assets, measured at their market value, as collateral to secure
debt. I show that a period of large capital inflow causes an increase in the demand
for capital for both unconstrained and constrained firms. At the initial valuation of
capital, only unconstrained firms can freely adjust their demand for capital. How-
ever, the increase in the aggregate demand for capital increases its valuation and
thus generates a loosening in financing constraints for ex-ante constrained firms,
and an amplified response at the firm level and on macroeconomic aggregates.
Capital Inflows, Financial Development,




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Carlos Végh Chair/Advisor
Assistant Professor Pablo D’Erasmo Advisor
Assistant Professor Anton Korinek Advisor
Associate Professor Borag̃an Aruoba Advisor
Associate Professor Gerard Hoberg Dean’s Representative
DEDICATION
To my loving wife and my parents for holding me through the rough times.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to my advisors, Carlos Végh, Anton Korinek, and Pablo D’Erasmo
for guiding me through this process, helping me to clear out my ideas, and encour-
aging me to keep on working on these topics. I would also like to thank partici-
pants at the Economic Department’s seminar, specially to Alan Drazen, John Halti-
wanger, Borag̃an Aruoba, and John Shea that also gave me interesting insights that
helped shape my thoughts. Carmen Reinhart advised me on early stages of this
project. Her insights were key to develop my ideas fully. I also want to thank
Herman Kamil, Nicolas Magud, Jose Luis Torres, and Maria Belen Sbrancia that




2 Literature Review 4
2.1 Capital Flow Bonanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Macroeconomic Implications of Financial Imperfections . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Firm Level Investment and Financial Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 An Empirical Exploration of the Effect of Capital Inflow Booms at the
Firm Level 11
3.1 A Canonical Model of Investment at the Firm Level: The Q-Theory
of Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 Data and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.1 Event Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.2 Reduced Form Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4 Summary of Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
iv
4 Financial Development and Credit Frictions at the Firm Level: An Ana-
lytical Framework 58
4.1 The Firm-Household Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1.1 Transmission Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.1.2 Recursive Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.1 Functional Forms and Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.2 Stationary Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.3 Dynamic Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.4 Aggregate Amplification Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.5 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2.6 Exogenous Discounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A Data Cleaning Procedure 94
B Panel VAR Results 95
C Solution Method 99
v
List of Tables
3.1 Aggregate Variables Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 High Financial Development: Firm and Debt Enforcement Data . . . 22
3.3 Low Financial Development: Firm and Debt Enforcement Data . . . 23
3.4 High Financial Development: Macroeconomic Data . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5 Low Financial Development: Macroeconomic Data . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.6 Firm Level Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.7 Significance of coefficcient for High FD (t-stat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.8 Significance of the coefficient for Low FD(t-stat) . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.9 Q-Investment Regressions: Benchmark Results and Composition of
Capital Inflows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.10 Financial Reforms, Credit and Output Booms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.11 Investment Opportunities and Access to Foreign Cap. Market . . . . 38
3.12 Firms’ Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.13 Tradability and Access to External Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.14 Instrumental Variables Approach: Auxiliary Regression . . . . . . . . 43
3.15 Instrumental Variables Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
vi
3.16 Robustness Check: Benchmark Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.17 Robustness Check: Financial Reforms, Credit and Output Booms . . 47
3.18 Robustness Check: Investment Opportunities and Access to Exter-
nal Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.19 Robustness Check: Tradability and Access to External Finance . . . . 50
3.20 Response of Investment to Cash flow to Capital for different Levels
of Financial Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.21 Estimation Results Panel VAR Model: All Sample . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.22 Estimation Results Panel VAR Model: KI Boom . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1 Parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Steady State Capital, Bonds, and Leverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3 Initial increase in Investment: Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 Initial increase in Price of Capital: Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5 Steady State Capital, Bonds, and Leverage with Exogenous Discount-
ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
vii
List of Figures
3.1 Financial Development (Efficiency Rate and Private Credit) . . . . . . 20
3.2 Financial Development (Recovery Rate and Private Credit) . . . . . . 20
3.3 Financial Development (Cost of Bankruptcy Procedure and Private
Credit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4 Financial Development (Creditor Rights and Private Credit) . . . . . 21
3.5 Episodes by Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.6 Capital Inflow Boom Episodes and Global Financing Conditions . . . 26
3.7 Event Analysis: Capital Inflow Booms (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.8 Event Analysis: Capital Inflow Booms (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.9 Fitted Values of Linear Probability Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Market for Aggregate Capital and Amplification Effect . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 Unconditional Distribution over Bond Holdings (Perfect Credit Mar-
ket) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3 Unconditional Distribution over Capital (Perfect Credit Market) . . . 74
4.4 Bond Holding Distribution for different degrees of Financial Devel-
opment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
viii
4.5 Capital and Bond Demand Functions for High and Low FD . . . . . 76
4.6 Initial and Final Distribution over Capital Holdings . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.7 Initial and Final Distribution over Bond Holdings . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.8 Cumulative Bond Holding Distribution after Shock . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.9 Response of Macroeconomic Aggregates for Low and High Degree
of Financial Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.10 Response of Macroeconomic Aggregates for Mid and High Degree
of Financial Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.11 Response of Firm Level variables for different degrees of Financial
Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.12 Response of Macroeconomic Aggregates (Amplification Effect) . . . 86
4.13 Initial Increase in Aggregate Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.14 Steady States for different degrees of Financial Development (Ex-
ogenous Discounting) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.15 Response of Macroeconomic Aggregates for High and Low level of
Financial Development (Exogenous Discounting) . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.16 Aggregate Amplification Effect Low Financial Development (Exoge-
nous Discounting) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.17 Dynamic Amplification Effect High Financial Development (Exoge-
nous Discounting) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.1 Impulse Response: High FD (All Sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
ix
B.2 Impulse Response: Low FD (All Sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
B.3 Impulse Response: High FD (KI Boom) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97




This dissertation is composed of two related essays on the effects of periods of large
capital inflows on macroeconomic aggregates and financing constraints at the firm
level, and the relationship of the differences in these effects among developed and
emerging economies with the degree of financial development.
In the first essay I conduct an empirical exploration of this topic. I show that
periods of large capital inflow are associated with more volatile macroeconomic
outcomes in economies with a low degree of financial development, relative to
economies with more developed financial systems. Employing firm level data for
42 countries, I find that firms in economies with a low level of financial develop-
ment exhibit a relatively larger loosening in the cost of borrowing and a larger ap-
preciation in equity prices. I show that financing constraints are more prevalent in
firms located in countries with a low degree of financial development. Moreover,
capital inflow booms relax these financing constraints. This decrease is significant
regardless of the composition of capital inflows, stronger when coupled with do-
mestic credit booms, larger for firms in the non-tradable sector and larger for firms
that depend more heavily on internal funds to finance their investment opportu-
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nities. The main contribution of the first essay is to use periods of large capital
inflows as an exogenous event, not related to idiosyncratic investment opportu-
nities at the firm level, and show that financing constraints decrease during these
periods for firms in countries characterized by a low degree of financial develop-
ment.
In the second essay, using a theoretical model, I explain the larger aggregate
response around capital inflow booms, as arising from varying degrees of finan-
cial development, and their relation to the pervasiveness of credit constraints at
the firm level. I propose a heterogeneous agents model in which the share of
borrowing-constrained agents depends on the level of financial development. Agents
in an economy characterized by a low degree of financial development, due to
more pervasive agency problems, can use a lower share of their assets measured at
their market value as collateral to secure debt. I show that a period of large capital
inflows causes an increase in the demand for capital for both unconstrained and
constrained firms. At the initial valuation of capital, only unconstrained firms can
freely adjust their demand for capital. However, the increase in the aggregate de-
mand for capital increases its aggregate valuation and thus generates a loosening
in financing constraints for ex-ante constrained firms, and an amplified response
at the firm as well as the aggregate level.
The dynamic response to this aggregate shock affects differently economies in
which financing constraints are more pervasive. This amplification in the aggre-
gate response is composed of two effects. Given that firms face an upward slop-
ing supply of capital, a shock that induces unconstrained firms to invest causes
increases in the aggregate price of capital. This produces a relaxation of the bor-
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rowing constraint for constrained firms. The second effect is related to the ampli-
fication in the response of ex-ante constrained firms that are able to adjust capital
freely as long as the appreciation in the valuation of capital lasts. The main contri-
bution of the second essay is to focus on the allocational consequences of periods of
large capital inflow, highlighting a transmission channel that involves the increase
in the market value of capital in the relaxation of financing constraints, and the
distortion in aggregate outcomes that arises from the interaction of the response
from ex-ante constrained and unconstrained firms.
These results are important in the current debate on the design of policies that
try to mitigate the incidence of financial crisis. The imposition of capital controls,
or limiting the increase in the value of capital in this model, would have an al-
locational effect that has been neglected so far in the literature. Therefore, a het-
erogeneous agents environment in which the behavior of both constrained and
unconstrained firms is taken into account, is key to understand the implications
of these type of policies. The increase in the price of capital allows firms that are
constrained to increase their capital stock, and loosen the effect of a low level of
financial development, at least while the pecuniary externality described persists.
Taking this into account, policies that would try to address directly the sources
of the low level of financial development, and ultimately of the pervasiveness of




This dissertation is related to three strands of the macroeconomics literature. The
first is the study of the cause and consequences of periods of large capital inflows.
The second one is the study of the macroeconomic implications of frictions in the
financial sector that amplify and propagate shocks over the business cycle. The
third component is the literature that studies the relationship between investment
and financial constraints at the firm level. These topics have been widely studied
separately in the open macroeconomics literature and what is novel in this disser-
tation is the approach taken to combine them and provide a response to relevant
questions raised on the causes, consequences, and policy responses to periods of
large capital inflow. This chapter surveys the main contributions in each of these
topics and highlights the value added that this dissertation makes to each of them.
However a comprehensive survey of each of the strands of the literature is out of
the scope of this chapter and the references within each study cited would give a
broader view.
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2.1 Capital Flow Bonanzas
A large literature has studied the causes and consequences of periods of large cap-
ital inflows. The adverse consequences that these periods exert, most notably in
emerging economies, has resulted in many authors trying to explain the "capital in-
flow problem". Theoretically, if countries are financially integrated, capital should
flow from rich, capital abundant countries, to poor countries in which capital is
relatively more scarce and the marginal productivity of capital is larger. However
this prediction of the open economy model only seems to hold during specific pe-
riods of time. Often these periods have ended abruptly, characterized by sudden
reversals in the flow of capital, and they have been followed by sharp contractions
in output, banking and balance of payments crises.
Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) represent the most recent and complete survey of
the literature on this topic. They find that loose global financing conditions, com-
modity prices and low growth in advanced economies help predict the number of
capital inflow episodes. They also find that in emerging economies these periods
are characterized by increases in domestic demand and asset prices. Also they are
often followed by banking and current account crises.
Cardarelli and others (2007) studies the policy responses to periods of large
capital inflows. They show that fiscal restraint decreases the probability of these
periods ending up with a current account crises and that if these flows are persis-
tent interventions that limit nominal currency appreciations are ineffective. Also,
they develop an algorithm to classify years of capital inflow booms similar to the
one proposed in chapter 3. They highlight the importance of the quality of financial
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markets to predict the aftermath of these periods and the proper policy responses.
Many studies, recently surveyed in Chapter 14 of Vegh (forthcoming), have
tried to determine if external or domestic factors are responsible for periods of
large capital inflows. Most of these studies find that external factors are more likely
to trigger these periods but that differences in domestic factors are responsible for
the macroeconomic consequences of them.
Relating the causes and consequences that these periods have at the individual
level, one of the main contributions of this paper, is a topic that has not received
much attention. However, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) study the effect on macro-
economic, financial, and firm level data of periods of increases in domestic credit
to the private sector. They show that these periods are characterized by larger
fluctuations of macroeconomic aggregates and firm level variables in emerging
economies. For emerging markets domestic credit booms and capital flow bonan-
zas are often simultaneous.
2.2 Macroeconomic Implications of Financial Imper-
fections
A second component of the macroeconomics and international economics litera-
ture that this paper is related to, is the one that studies the macroeconomic impli-
cations of financial imperfections, as the widely studied financial accelerator mech-
anism of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). It is also related to the research
agenda surveyed on Arellano and Mendoza (2002), and more recently represented
by Mendoza (2010) that aims to quantify the macroeconomic implications of finan-
cial frictions of the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) type. Jeanne and Korinek (2010)
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and Bianchi (2009) study the normative implications of magnification of credit cy-
cles by the interaction between collateralizable debt and asset prices (or the real
exchange rate).
Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2009) study the responses to periods of current
account liberalizations for different degrees of development of the financial sys-
tem. The definition of the degree of financial development is the same as the one
used in chapter 4. However, the transmission channel they highlight is related to
the failure of a poor financial system to transfer purchasing power efficiently from
savers to investing agents due to agency problems. After a financial liberalization
the economy receives capital inflows that are amplified by an asset price appreci-
ation that loosens borrowing constraints, but the aftermath differs depending on
the degree of financial development.
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) use a heterogeneous agents model to study the
effects of a credit crunch on consumer demand. They model a closed economy in
which the interest rate adjusts to equalize borrowing and lending from households.
They show that adding nominal rigidities on the lower bound of the interest rate
tend to amplify recessions. Even though they do not use financial frictions, theirs
is a first approach to study changes in borrowing constraints in a heterogeneous
agents environment. Buera and Moll (2012) employ a heterogenous agents closed
economy model with financial frictions to study the implications of an exogenous
shock to collateral constraint to highlight that allocational features, that can only be
highlighted in heterogeneous agents models, are an important transmission chan-
nel in the propagation and amplification of financial shocks. However, their main
goal is to understand how important are financial shocks in the explanation of
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aggregate fluctuations. Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012) use a heterogeneous
agents closed economy model with privately and publicly traded firms that face
collateral constraints. They find that in their proposed environment disturbances
in financial markets explain a large share of macroeconomic fluctuations. Even
though these studies share some features of the model in chapter 4, this disserta-
tion proposes a novel transmission channel by which endogenous changes in asset
prices relax borrowing constraints for ex-ante constrained economies generating
amplification in macroeconomic responses.
2.3 Firm Level Investment and Financial Constraints
Another strand of the literature that is related to this dissertation is the one study-
ing the relationship between investment and financial constraints. Pioneered by
Fazzari and others (1988), this literature interprets a positive and significant corre-
lation between firm level investment and the financial net worth of the firm as a
rejection of a perfect financial markets model. Notably, Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
challenge these results and a large debate, surveyed on Schiantarelli (1996), has
ensued on these findings that give a role to financing constraints in determining
investment.
Many authors have disregarded the relationship between financial variables
and investment at the firm level as evidence of financing constraints. Using a
structural model approach, Cooper and Ejarque (2003) show that this positive re-
lationship can be obtained in a model without financing frictions, and explained
by firms with market power. Eberly and Abel (2004) and more recently Eberly,
Rebelo, and Vincent (2009) obtain a positive and significant relationship between
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investment and financial variables without assuming financing frictions and ad-
justment costs to investment. Their results rely mainly on decreasing returns to
scale, or monopoly power.
Bayraktar, Sakellaris, and Vermeulen (2005) use a model that allows for the ex-
istence of convex and non-convex adjustment costs, as well as financing frictions in
a representative agent model of a closed economy. They calibrate the model using
moments from a sample of manufacturing firms from Germany, and find that both
real and financial frictions are important to explain investment dynamics. Loren-
zoni and Walentin (2007) propose a model in which financial frictions weaken the
response of investment to Tobin’s q and creates a relationship between investment
and cash flow that fits data from U.S. stock market listed firms from 1978 to 1989.
Empirical explorations similar to the one proposed in chapter 3 have been pro-
posed by some authors. Notably, Love (2003) shows that financial development
reduces financial constraints at the firm level by showing how liquidity at the firm
level, as a proxy for financing conditions, impacts investment, after controlling for
investment opportunities. Love and Zicchino (2006), using a Panel VAR identify
orthogonal shocks to financial variables in a sample of developing and emerging
economies. They find that the relationship between investment and a shock to
financial conditions is significantly stronger for firms in countries with less devel-
oped financial systems. The work that is more related to the findings in chapter 3
is Harrison, Love, and Mcmillan (2004). In that paper, they find empirically that
direct foreign investment decrease firms financial constraints, and that restrictions
in capital account transactions have increased them.
I add to this literature by proposing an structural, general equilibrium, het-
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erogeneous agents model that highlights a transmission channel describing how
financial constraints are relaxed during periods of large capital inflows, and how
the effect of this relaxation depends explicitly on the level of financial develop-
ment. An empirical contribution of this dissertation is to show that financing con-
straints decrease regardless of the nature of capital inflows given that the larger
increase in the aggregate price of capital loosens borrowing constraints and not
only direct foreign investment influences outcomes at the firm level.
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Chapter 3
An Empirical Exploration of the Effect
of Capital Inflow Booms at the Firm
Level
Capital inflow booms affect emerging and developed economies differently. For
emerging economies, capital flow bonanzas are associated with more volatile macro-
economic outcomes, appreciations in exchange rates and asset prices. They usually
precede financial and sovereign debt crises. These empirical regularities have been
largely documented and policy measures as capital controls and macroprudential
regulation have been proposed to counteract the potential harmful consequences
of capital inflows. However the microeconomic causes of this amplified responses
and the potential effects at the individual level have not been studied widely.
Using data on macroeconomic aggregates, I show that, given common-sized
increases in capital inflows, economies characterized by a low degree of financial
development, undergo larger increases in aggregate output, private consumption,
and investment, when compared to the reaction evidenced in economies with a
higher level of financial development. At the microeconomic level, using a cross-
country firm-level panel data set, during large capital inflow periods firms in low
11
financial development economies show larger decreases in the effective cost of
debt, and a larger increase in the market price-to-book ratio of equity.
These findings motivate the study of the behavior of financing constraints around
periods of large capital inflows. In this chapter, I show that during these periods
firms located in countries with low levels of financial development experience a
loosening in financial constraints. The approach that I employ to test the effect
of financing constraints on firms’ behavior has been widely used, as explained in
chapter 2. This approach defines the relation between internal funds and the in-
vestment rate at the firm level, as a measure of financing constraints. In a perfect
capital market environment firms should be able to freely finance investment op-
portunities, and the level of internal funds, or other financial variables at the firm
level, should not be correlated with the investment rate. Using tests suggested by
the q-theory of investment, regression analysis shows that for firms in economies
with a low degree of financial development, the conditional correlation between
investment and the cash flow of the firm, representing internal funds, is larger than
for economies with a higher level of financial development. Moreover, periods of
large capital inflow decrease this conditional correlation between cash flow and
the investment rate. However, given that many caveats apply to this approach, I
conduct some robustness tests and find that the benchmark results are robust to
different specifications. Also, employing a Panel VAR methodology that does not
rely on functional assumptions to derive estimating equations, I conduct an analy-
sis that shows how financing constraints, measured as the response of investment
to shocks in financial variables not correlated to changes in fundamentals, decrease
during periods of large capital inflow.
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In section 3.1, I develop a canonical investment model to derive the relation
between investment, financial variables at the firm level, and investment opportu-
nities –proxied by the market-to-book ratio of the firm (average q)– that motivates
the empirical strategy. In section 3.2, I describe the dataset used and the method-
ology employed to determine periods of large capital inflows and the level of fi-
nancial development. In section 3.3, I describe the empirical approach and show
the results, along with the main robustness tests. The last section of this essay
concludes and highlights the main findings.
3.1 A Canonical Model of Investment at the Firm Level:
The Q-Theory of Investment
A canonical neoclassical model can be used to show how if capital markets are
perfect, investment should react solely to investment opportunities, represented
by the marginal benefit of an extra unit of capital (marginal q). Moreover, Hayashi
(1982) shows that under certain technological conditions and market structure, the
market price-to-book ratio of the firm, an observable variable, is related to mar-
ginal q, which is not observable. In this section, I use this canonical model to derive
the estimation equation used in the empirical results and to show how financing
constraints can distort these results.1
Assume there is a large number of firms that are price takers in their output
and inputs markets. Their objective is to maximize the stream of dividends dt,
discounted by the factor Mt. They choose investment it, demand for labor lt, de-
1In chapter 4 I propose and solve a general equilibrium model with endogenous financing con-
straints. The model described in this chapter serves the purpose of explaining the empirical strat-
egy.
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mand for capital kt, and can borrow or lend freely at an exogenous gross interest
rate R up to an exogenous debt limit −Φ. Denote the level of savings (debt if neg-
ative) as bt. Firms operate a constant returns to scale technology that is linearly
homogeneous in k and l, and is subject to productivity shocks denoted by zt. Also,






. This function is increasing and convex in i and it also satisfies the condition





is linearly homogeneous in i and k. Capital depreciates at
the rate δ.





























s.t. it = kt+1 − (1− δ) kt (multiplier qt) (3.2)
bt+1 ≥ −Φ (multiplier µt) (3.3)
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Given that the production function is linearly homogeneous, F(kt+1,lt+1) =
F1 (kt+1, lt+1) kt+1 + F2 (kt+1, lt+1) lt+1, and using the optimal demand for labor
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Suppose that the firm operates in an environment in which the constraint on










This implies that the present discounted value (at the exogenous and constant
gross interest rate R) of the stream of dividends of the firm, which is by definition





By Equation 3.7, qt is also equal to the marginal benefit of an extra unit of cap-
ital, marginal q. Then average q can be used as a proxy for investment opportuni-
ties, and it is a sufficient statistic for the investment rate at the firm level under the
perfect capital markets hypothesis.










, where φ̇ > 0.
Using Equation 3.6:













This result shows how average q, used as a proxy for investment opportuni-
ties, solely determines the investment to fixed capital rate at the firm level under
the perfect capital markets hypothesis. However, for a firm that is financially con-
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strained, the discount factor applied to the stream of dividends will be modified
as well as the relation between investment and average q. For example, for a firm
in which the borrowing constraint, bt+1 = −Φ which implies µt > 0, and the level
of desired investment has to be financed from internal funds.
This is the reason for including a proxy of internal funds of the firm in the
specification given in the modification of Equation 3.8 in the empirical strategy.
How tight the constraint is for an individual firm is directly related to the degree
of financial development at the country level. Moreover, the main hypothesis to
be tested using this specification is related to the change of this relationship (as a
indicating the presence of financing constraints) during periods of capital inflow
booms.
3.2 Data and Definitions
I use annual data from 42 economies for the period 1990 to 2009. The source of
macroeconomic data is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). I collect data on gross domestic product, pri-
vate aggregate consumption, gross fixed capital formation, the GDP deflator, the
financial account (and its components) for each country. To conduct robustness
checks to the benchmark empirical results, I also use domestic credit to the private
sector from IFS.
In order to classify countries among low and high financial development groups,
I use the dataset on debt enforcement collected by Djankov and others (2008). They
document differences in procedures, as well as recovery and efficiency rates in the
disposition of assets, in the bankruptcy case of a hypothetical firm for 88 coun-
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tries2. In this paper I use the efficiency and recovery rate, the estimated cost of
the insolvency proceeding, and an index of creditor rights for each of the countries
in the sample. Details on each of these variables, as well as macroeconomic ag-
gregates, can be found in Table 3.1. I classify a country as one with high financial
development if it ranks in at least three of the mentioned measures above (below
for the cost) than the all sample median3. Country values for each of these vari-
ables are shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.
Table 3.1: Aggregate Variables Definition
Variable Description and Source
Macroeconomic Aggregates
Financial Account (Net) in US$ Records credit and debit transactions in financial assets with non-residents. IFS
Financial Account (Gross) in US$ Records sales of financial assets with non-residents of the reporting economy. IFS
Portfolio Financial Flows in US$ Gross financial account excluding foreign direct investment. IFS
Output in US$ Gross domestic product. IFS
Consumption Aggregate consumption from the private sector. IFS
Investment Gross fixed capital formation. IFS
Output in local currency Gross domestic product. IFS
All aggregate data in local currency expressed in real terms using the GDP Deflator from IFS.
Financial Development (Source: Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008))
Creditor rights An index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (1998).
Cost The estimated cost of the insolvency proceeding, as a % of the value of the insolvency estate..
Efficiency rate Present value of the terminal value of the firm after bankruptcy costs.
Recovery rate Present value of the terminal value for claimant bank.
The literature has often relied on macroeconomic aggregates as private credit
to GDP ratio, stock market capitalization, private bond market capitalization, and
deposits in the financial system, to denote the level of financial development, as is
described in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009). However, even after taking
historical averages of these macroeconomic variables, all of them are potentially
2India and Pakistan are not included in this dataset but I decided to label them as countries with
low financial development.
3Results are robust to an specification in which countries are separated as Developed and
Emerging by their income per-capita.
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correlated with periods of large capital inflow and thus would not be an ideal
instrument to identify countries with high and low financial development. Using
the measures proposed by Djankov and others (2008) that are structural, persistent,
related to the actual financing constraints that firms face, and more importantly
not related to periods of large capital inflow permits to classify countries in a more
transparent way.
The measures of financial development used in this paper are related to the
most common measure of financial development used in the literature that is the
ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP. In Figure 3.1 the efficiency rate cal-
culated for each country by Djankov and others (2008) is related to the average
between 1990 and 2009 of private credit to GDP. There is clearly a positive rela-
tionship between these two variables. In Figure 3.2 the relationship between the
recovery rate and private credit suggests also a positive relationship between these
variables. In Figure 3.3, the cost of the bankruptcy procedure is negatively related
to private credit, and Figure 3.4 shows the positive relationship between the index
of creditor rights and private credit.
The source of firm level data is Worldscope for the period 1990 to 2009 for the
same group of countries. Worldscope collects balance sheet and earnings state-
ment data for publicly traded firms. Its scope ranges from full coverage in some
developed economies, to all firms for which there has been investors interests in
some emerging economies. I show firm level variables constructed from World-
scope and their definitions in Table 3.64. In the empirical results, I use data for
non-financial firms. The list of countries, median number of firms used by year,
4The data cleaning procedure is summarized in Appendix A
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and the total number of firm-year observations are shown for high and low de-
gree of financial development countries in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. In Table 3.4 and
Table 3.5, I show the median values of the financial account to GDP ratio, the in-
vestment and cash flow to capital ratios, and average Q for all firms in each country
for high and low financial development respectively.
Table 3.2: High Financial Development: Firm and Debt Enforcement Data









Australia 215 5818 87.80 84.90 3.00 0.08
Austria 38 723 78.00 77.30 3.00 0.18
Belgium 38 731 90.80 90.80 2.00 0.04
Canada 303 7329 93.20 93.20 1.00 0.04
Denmark 61 1123 76.70 74.10 3.00 0.09
Finland 40 744 92.40 92.40 1.00 0.04
France 251 4911 54.10 46.60 0.00 0.09
Germany 236 4967 57.00 55.70 3.00 0.08
Hong Kong, China 251 5469 88.30 86.30 4.00 0.09
Ireland 28 545 89.90 89.90 1.00 0.09
Israel 45 1352 66.20 51.40 3.00 0.23
Japan 1200 21712 95.50 95.50 2.00 0.04
Korea, Rep. 162 5319 88.10 88.10 3.00 0.04
Netherlands 72 1379 94.90 94.20 3.00 0.01
New Zealand 42 798 90.70 80.10 4.00 0.04
Norway 65 1295 91.80 91.80 2.00 0.01
Portugal 4 54 82.30 60.60 1.00 0.09
Singapore 141 3648 96.10 95.10 3.00 0.01
Spain 60 1068 82.00 59.00 2.00 0.14
Sweden 80 1940 86.00 81.30 1.00 0.09
Switzerland 92 1696 60.40 60.40 1.00 0.04
United Kingdom 636 11928 92.30 90.70 4.00 0.06
United States 1490 25662 85.80 85.80 1.00 0.07
Total 79 110211 88.10 85.80 2.00 0.07
Source: Worldscope and Djankov et.al (2008)
Capital inflow booms are defined similarly to Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) as
years when the financial account to gross domestic product, that measures the size
of capital inflow, is larger than the 80th percentile value for the country specific dis-
tribution between 1985 and 2009. To be sure that the algorithm picks up relevant
periods of large capital inflows the definition also requires the Financial Account
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Table 3.3: Low Financial Development: Firm and Debt Enforcement Data









Argentina 25 501 35.80 30.60 1.00 0.12
Brazil 99 1755 13.40 8.20 1.00 0.12
Chile 65 1207 40.90 21.70 2.00 0.14
Colombia 11 214 64.80 49.10 0.00 0.01
Egypt, Arab Rep. 17 355 28.60 23.30 2.00 0.22
Greece 32 994 53.80 38.80 1.00 0.09
India 43 463
Indonesia 183 6444 25.10 25.10 2.00 0.18
Italy 81 1879 45.30 37.40 2.00 0.22
Malaysia 247 5822 48.40 33.70 3.00 0.14
Mexico 51 925 72.60 51.30 0.00 0.18
Morocco 8 130 41.90 28.30 1.00 0.18
Pakistan 44 995
Peru 25 550 41.80 30.70 0.00 0.07
Philippines 65 1050 17.50 17.50 1.00 0.38
South Africa 101 2088 39.80 39.30 3.00 0.18
Thailand 134 2964 54.90 44.60 2.00 0.36
Turkey 51 1242 6.60 6.60 2.00 0.07
Venezuela, RB 11 170 13.10 13.00 3.00 0.38
Total 54 29748 40.90 30.60 2.00 0.18
Source: Worldscope and Djankov et.al (2008)
Table 3.4: High Financial Development: Macroeconomic Data
Data by Country FA GDP Inv to Cap Cashflow to Cap Avg Q
Australia 4.51 4.53 24.55 1.60
Austria -0.06 5.86 27.43 1.43
Belgium -3.97 1.94 37.09 1.34
Canada -1.20 5.52 18.35 1.58
Denmark -1.24 2.98 27.83 1.18
Finland -2.99 4.77 24.75 1.26
France -0.50 0.98 38.89 1.59
Germany -0.56 3.04 32.09 1.96
Hong Kong, China -5.49 3.06 15.73 0.95
Ireland -1.00 3.30 30.60 1.84
Israel -0.77 2.27 21.46 1.43
Japan -2.79 1.14 17.84 1.15
Korea, Rep. -1.16 3.32 20.74 0.76
Netherlands -3.00 3.85 30.41 1.62
New Zealand 3.29 2.72 21.51 1.45
Norway -6.27 4.41 17.34 1.48
Portugal 3.47 5.22 12.38 0.82
Singapore -17.33 2.13 18.73 1.16
Spain 3.11 1.66 20.48 1.43
Sweden -1.35 3.64 26.38 1.75
Switzerland -9.79 1.51 25.58 1.35
United Kingdom 1.78 4.40 26.84 1.76
United States 2.63 3.40 35.71 1.89
Total -1.24 3.17 24.78 1.46
Source: Worldscope and IFS
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Table 3.5: Low Financial Development: Macroeconomic Data
Data by Country FA GDP Inv to Cap Cashflow to Cap Avg Q
Argentina 2.39 3.84 20.12 1.06
Brazil 1.41 3.89 23.16 0.83
Chile 1.35 3.49 19.14 1.38
Colombia 1.79 1.38 16.17 0.85
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.40 5.13 44.20 1.61
Greece 4.76 2.14 22.82 1.79
India 1.02 14.59 24.39 1.30
Indonesia -0.17 9.44 25.78 1.40
Italy 0.66 1.98 25.48 1.23
Malaysia -6.74 1.54 17.02 0.95
Mexico 1.82 2.54 18.07 1.30
Morocco -1.06 7.66 63.86 2.38
Pakistan 2.43 2.08 19.68 1.09
Peru 2.40 0.90 24.24 1.15
Philippines 0.70 0.27 14.20 0.79
South Africa 0.93 8.82 37.64 1.55
Thailand -2.21 1.68 24.61 1.08
Turkey 1.01 3.85 40.75 1.52
Venezuela, RB -4.53 -1.05 13.73 0.58
Total 1.25 3.27 23.14 1.23
Source: Worldscope and IFS
Table 3.6: Firm Level Variables
Variable Worldscope Definition
Capital Expenditure Funds used to acquire fixed assets other than those associated with acquisitions
Capital Gross Property, Plant and Equipment less accumulated reserves for depreciation, depletion and amortization
Average Q Price to book ratio of equity
Debt Represents all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations
Interest expense Amount of interest paid by the company during the year as shown on the cash flow statement
Common equity Common shareholders’ investment
Price Closing price of the company’s stock
Cash flow Net cash receipts and disbursements resulting from the operations of the company.
Sales Represent gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances
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to GDP ratio to be larger that 3%5. Only the capital inflow boom episodes between
1990 and 2009 are shown in Figure 3.5. This algorithm defines 111 episodes, 45
and 66 for high and low financial development economies respectively. Figure 3.6
confirms the findings by Reinhart and Reinhart (2009); the likelihood of undergo-
ing a capital inflow bonanza increases with lower global financing conditions with
a lag. Years when the federal funds rate has dropped significatively in real terms,
as a proxy for global financing conditions, are followed by years when there is a
surge in capital flows. Moreover, there is a concentration of these periods in the
middle of the 1990’s decade as well as the years after 2002. The empirical strategy
to be explained below, makes use of these empirical regularities to propose capital
inflow booms as events that are exogenous to firms in an economy, and that are
triggered by global loose financing conditions6.
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.3.1 Event Analysis
The first step in the empirical analysis is to compare the behavior exhibited by
macroeconomic aggregates and firm level variables in low and high financial de-
velopment economies around periods of large capital inflows using an event analy-
sis. For macroeconomic aggregates each variable is defined as the log-deviation
5I used different thresholds for the FA/GDP ratio (0%, 4% and 5%) and main results do not
change significatively.
6The IMF’s World Economic Outllook in 2007 (Cardarelli and others (2007)) used a similar defin-
ition to study capital inflow episodes for 50 developed and emerging economies between 1987 and
2006. The number of episodes they found was 109 and many of them are also classified by the al-
gorithm in this paper as capital inflow booms and similar empirical regularities in macroeconomic
aggregates.
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Figure 3.5: Episodes by Country
Country
Argentina 1993 1994 1997 1998 1999
Australia 2004 2005 2007
Austria 1995 1998 1999
Brazil 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Canada 1993 2009
Chile 1993 1998
Colombia 1995 1996 1997 1998
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1998 1999 2008
Finland 1991 1992 2008
Greece 2006 2007 2008 2009
India 2009
Indonesia 1991 1995 1997
Ireland 2000 2007 2008
Israel 1995 1996 1999 2000
Italy 1991 1992
Korea, Rep. 1996 1997
Malaysia 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mexico 1991 1992 1993 1994 1998
Morocco 2008 2009
New Zealand 1997 2005 2006
Norway 1998
Pakistan 1995 1996 2006 2007 2008
Peru 1995 1997
Philippines 1993 1995 1996 1997 2000
Portugal 2000 2006
South Africa 1998 2006 2007 2008 2009
Spain 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sweden 1993 2008
Thailand 1991 1992 1995 1996
Turkey 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008
United Kingdom 1999 2006 2009
United States 2000 2002 2003 2005 2006
Venezuela, RB 1992 1993 1998
Capital Inflow Boom Years
Figure 3.6: Capital Inflow Boom Episodes and Global Financing Conditions
26
from the Hoddrick-Prescott trend7. Then, I construct event windows three years
before, during, and three years after the capital inflow boom year. Then, I calculate
the median response for each group of countries. The top left panel of Figure 3.7
shows that for high and low financial development economies, the magnitude of
capital inflows relative to the size of the economy is similar around boom periods
for both groups of countries. However there is a significant difference in the be-
havior between high and low financial development economies during periods of
capital inflow booms for output, private aggregate consumption, and gross aggre-
gate investment.
For firm level data, I define the value for each of the variables in each coun-
try as the one exhibited by the median firm per year. To eliminate differences in
the behavior coming from country levels and to capture deviations from medium
term trend, I define each variable as the difference from the 10 year centered mov-
ing average. To calculate the event windows, I compute the median value across
countries for each of the groups, similarly than with macroeconomic aggregate
data. Results for firm level variables around capital inflow years are consistent
with the proposed hypothesis of the relaxation of financial constraints being re-
lated to different reactions at the micro and macroeconomic level.
Figure 3.8 shows that the investment to fixed capital rate presents a similar be-
havior for both groups of countries. However, the effective cost of borrowing, the
leverage ratio measured using the fixed capital stock using the market value, and
the price-to-book ratio of firms, evidence larger changes around periods of capital
7Each of the macroeconomic aggregates is expressed in real terms using the GDP deflator from
IFS. For the financial account, the ratio to GDP and not the natural logarithm is used to construct
event windows.
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Gross Fixed Capital Form
Low FD (Red-Dashed)
High FD(Blue-Solid)
Note: Log (except FA/GDP)deviation from HP Trend
Macro Data: Cyclical Components
inflow boom for economies characterized by a low level of financial development.
Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 show the t-stats for each of the variables in the event win-
dows. In general, the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant for the
deviation from the trend for firm level variables in countries with a high level of
financial development. However, they are significant for firms in economies with
a low level of financial development. These findings are consistent with periods of
capital inflow boom associated with significant amplified increases in the market
value of assets owned by firms, decreasing the leverage ratio, and decreases in the
cost of borrowing for firms in low financial development countries.
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Firms Data: Cyclical Components
Table 3.7: Significance of coefficcient for High FD (t-stat)
FinAccount Output Consumption Investment FirmInvest Price-to-Book DebtMktequity EffIntRate
t-3 -1.54 -1.77 -0.97 -0.35 -1.68 0.98 -0.93 -1.58
t-2 -0.80 -1.05 -0.53 -0.26 0.98 1.28 -0.78 -0.48
t-1 1.23 0.42 0.99 2.21 1.01 0.68 0.26 -0.30
t 5.02 1.58 2.19 1.99 2.03 -0.88 0.26 -1.03
t+1 0.43 1.10 1.46 1.26 0.85 -1.65 -0.79 0.26
t+2 -1.59 -0.61 -1.08 -0.76 0.15 -2.06 -0.04 -0.03
t+3 -1.19 -2.62 -4.50 -2.05 -0.64 -2.35 0.59 -0.60
Table 3.8: Significance of the coefficient for Low FD(t-stat)
FinAccount Output Consumption Investment FirmInvest Price-to-Book DebtMktequity EffIntRate
t-3 0.41 -2.02 -0.64 -1.33 -0.59 0.49 -2.38 -0.03
t-2 0.56 -0.51 1.30 0.37 1.22 0.95 -2.96 -0.75
t-1 2.87 2.02 2.43 3.29 1.37 1.55 -4.79 -1.98
t 6.99 3.83 7.16 8.45 0.70 -0.75 -3.23 -1.83
t+1 1.21 0.95 1.77 2.59 0.59 -2.90 -1.19 -1.00
t+2 -1.50 0.07 0.47 -1.05 -1.33 -1.54 0.30 -0.43
t+3 -1.12 -1.07 0.00 -0.47 -2.02 -4.41 0.34 -0.96
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3.3.2 Reduced Form Results
Q-Investment Regressions
To gain more understanding of firm-level behavior around capital inflow booms I
study the reaction of financial constraints during periods of large capital inflows
for firms in high and low financial development. I measure financial constraints
at the firm level as the response of investment to internal funds, controlling for in-
vestment opportunities. A larger conditional correlation between investment and
the cash flow (as a proxy for internal funds) of the firm, controlling for the mar-
ket to book ratio of assets (average Q), as a proxy for investment opportunities, is
related to larger financing constraints, as is described in section 3.1. If a period of
large capital inflow decreases financing constraints at the firm level, and this pe-
riod is not related to increases in investment opportunities not captured by average
q, the conditional correlation between cash flow and investment should decrease.
Moreover, if the level of financial development is related to financing constraints
this decrease should be larger for firms in countries with a low degree of financial
development.






q, the cash flow of the firm also scaled by the capital stock (Cash f lowk ), a country spe-
cific dummy variable indicating years of large capital inflows (KI Boom), a dummy
indicating if a country is from a low financial development country LowFinDev,
and the double and triple interaction term between the last three variables8. The
estimating equation is described in Equation (3.9).
8The LowFinDev clasification, given that it does not variate for a firm in the sample would be


























× (LowFinDevc)× (KI Boomct)
+ f j + dt + εjt
Firm (j) level, and year (t) fixed effects.
εjt is corrected for arbitrary correlation at the country (c)-year (t) level
This proposed specification allows to test for the two main hypothesis: (1) that
firms in countries with low financial development are subject to more pervasive
financing constraints and, (2) that periods of capital inflow booms decrease these
financing constraints more in countries with low financial development. Under the
proposed hypothesis, β2 > 0, suggests the presence of financing constraints at the
firm level, β5 > 0 implies that these constraints are more pervasive in countries
with a low level of financial development, β4 < 0 implies that these constraints
decrease during periods of large capital inflows and β7 < 0 would imply that this
relaxation is larger for firms in countries with low degree of financial development.
I control for constant unobserved heterogeneity among firms by removing time
invariant fixed effects at the firm level. To control for the effects of trends on the
variables, I include year fixed effects. Finally, standard errors are corrected for an
arbitrary correlation structure at the country-year level.
The empirical strategy exploits the fact that for an individual firm, a country
wide period of large capital inflows is an exogenous event that should not be re-
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lated to firm specific investment opportunities. After controlling for firm and year
fixed effects, any change in the reliance of investment on internal funds, can be
attributed to a change in financing constraints. There is still a possibility that the
capital inflow boom is related to homogeneous changes in investment opportu-
nities not reflected in average q and thus the specification given in Equation 3.9
would not represent changes in financing constraints. I address some of these con-
cerns in the robustness checks.
Results In the first column of Table 3.9 I show the benchmark result of the pro-
posed specification. The coefficient on Average q results positive and significant
as is standard in the literature. The positive and significant coefficient on the cash-
flow to capital rate and the interaction term confirms the first proposed hypothesis:
financing constraints are more pervasive for firms in countries with low financial
development. The size of the coefficient in the interaction term between the cash-
flow to capital rate and the dummy indicating that a firm operates in a low finan-
cial development country is close to 5 times larger than the coefficient on the cash
flow rate when this dummy is equal to zero, indicating an economic significatively
larger dependence on cash flow to fund investment opportunities in countries with
a low level of financial development.
The coefficient on the interaction term between the cash flow to capital rate
and the dummy indicating a year when the country was undergoing a capital in-
flow boom, results negative and significant indicating that capital inflow booms
decrease financing constraints. Moreover, the main hypothesis of the specification,
that this decrease is more relevant for firms in economies with a low level of fi-
nancial development is confirmed: the coefficient in the triple interaction term is
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negative and significant. This is the main result of this paper and it is confirmed
using different robustness tests.
The composition and direction of capital flows may influence the results given
that for an economy with an open capital account there may be booms in inflows
that are matched by outflows, and using the net flow position would not be in-
formative of the change in the size of inflows. The first robustness test addresses
the possibility that for countries with more open financial accounts, the net finan-
cial account position may not be a clear indicator of large capital inflows, and of
decreases in financing constraints at the firm level. To overcome this possibility,
I define periods of large capital inflows using gross capital inflows similarly than
with the net financial account. Column (2) Table 3.9 shows that the main results
do not change. Capital inflow booms decrease the reliance of investment on cash
flow significatively for firms in low financial development countries.
Another possibility is that the decrease in financing constraints is driven only
by foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. In Column (3) of Table 3.9 I show that the
composition of capital inflows does not matter: if only financial gross inflows are
used to determine which years are considered as capital inflow booms, the main
results do not change significatively. This result confirms that the transmission
channel is not only present when capital inflow booms are related to FDI flows,
but also when they are determined by financial flows. The main results explained
above still hold for the different definition of capital inflow booms: the interaction
term is only significant for firms located in countries classified as having a low
level of financial development.
Periods of large capital inflows have also been related to financial liberalization
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Table 3.9: Q-Investment Regressions: Benchmark Results and Composition of Cap-
ital Inflows
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Net FA Gross FA Financial Flows
Average q 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow x Low Fin. Dev. 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
KI Boom 0.005*** -0.000 0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow x KI Boom -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev. 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.013***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Cashflow x KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev -0.010** -0.008** -0.007*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Observations 129,948 129,948 129,948
Number of Firms 21,431 21,431 21,431
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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in emerging economies that increase investment opportunities to all firms, and
may not be related to increases in firm level fundamentals. To control for these
investment opportunities, I do not include as periods of large capital inflows years
that were the year before, the year after, or the same year classified as large finan-
cial reforms as defined by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010). Columns (1) of
Table 3.10 shows that the main findings are not affected when these observations
are not considered as capital inflow booms9.
In Column (2) of Table 3.10 I check the possibility that domestic credit booms
are responsible for the loosening in credit constraints at the firm level. Even though
this hypothesis is closely related to the loosening in financing constraints, if the
source of the loosening is domestic, the implication of capital inflow booms relax-
ing financing constraints could be related to endogenous changes in investment
opportunities at the firm level. For example, an increase in domestic credit can be
triggered by loose domestic monetary policy or by financial innovations in the do-
mestic credit sector, a result that would not be related to periods of booms in cap-
ital inflows. To test this hypothesis I define credit booms as years when domestic
credit per capita exceeds by 1.65 standard deviations from the Hoddrick-Prescott
country specific trend, a similar definition to the one proposed by Mendoza and
Terrones (2008), and replace the dummy variable of capital inflow booms in the
specification above with a domestic credit booms dummy. Credit booms are re-
lated to larger investment only for firms in low financial development economies,
and the triple interaction term is not significant.
Another possibility is that results are not driven by decreases in financing con-
9Close to 10% of periods are removed from representing periods of large capital inflows if they
are accompanied by large financial reforms.
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straints during periods of large capital inflow but that investment opportunities
not captured by average q due to specification or measurement error, are responsi-
ble for the decrease in financing constraints. To control for this possibility I define
output booms, defined similarly than capital inflow booms but using the top 20%
in the deviations from the Hoddrick-Prescott trend. Column (3) of Table 3.10 show
that the interaction terms are not significant implying that output booms that may
be related to increases in investment opportunities are not related to decreases in
financing constraints10.
To check if investment opportunities, measured using average q, change signi-
ficatively during periods of large capital inflows, and if the decrease in financing
constraints is not present when taking this into account, I add to the specification
above an interaction term between average q and the capital inflow dummy, an
interaction term between average q and the financial development dummy, and
the triple interaction term between average q, the capital inflow boom dummy,
and the low financial development dummy. Results in Column (1) of Table 3.11
do not change as is described by the coefficient in the triple interaction term be-
tween cashflow, capital inflow booms, and the low financial development dummy.
More importantly the triple interaction term that includes average q does not result
significant.
As another robustness test I use data on the issuance of American Depositary
Receipts (ADR)11 at the firm level, given that firms with access to foreign capital
markets do not face the same degree of financing constraints that the ones that
10Only 49 out of the 141 capital inflow booms are catalogued as output booms.
11American Depository Receipts are shares of foreign companies that can be purchased in the
United States, with transactons settled and dividends paid in dollars.
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Table 3.10: Financial Reforms, Credit and Output Booms
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES No Fin. Reform Credit Boom Output Boom
Average q 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]




Cashflow x KI Boom -0.004***
[0.001]
KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev. 0.017***
[0.004]
Cashflow x KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev -0.010**
[0.005]




Credit Boom x Low Fin. Dev 0.029***
[0.007]
Cashflow x Cred. Boom x Low Fin Dev 0.007
[0.008]




Cashflow x Output Boom X Low Fin. Dev 0.002
[0.004]
Observations 129,948 129,948 129,948
Number of Firms 21,431 21,431 21,431
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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can not. In columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.11, I show that firms in countries with a
low level of financial development and that do not have access to foreign capital
markets through the issuance of ADR are the ones whose financing constraints
are relaxed during periods of large capital inflows as the negative and significant
coefficient in the triple interaction term in column (3) shows.
Table 3.11: Investment Opportunities and Access to Foreign Cap. Market
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Investment Opp. ADR No ADR
Average q 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.039***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
Cashflow 0.008*** -0.008*** 0.009***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
Cashflow x Low Fin. Dev. 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.045***
[0.003] [0.007] [0.003]
KI Boom 0.002 0.021** 0.004**
[0.003] [0.009] [0.002]
Cashflow x KI Boom -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.003***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
Avg. q x KI Boom 0.006**
[0.003]
Avg. q x Low Fin. Dev -0.004
[0.003]
KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev. 0.021*** -0.000 0.019***
[0.005] [0.012] [0.005]
Avg. q x KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev -0.004
[0.005]
Cashflow x KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev -0.011** 0.013 -0.014***
[0.005] [0.010] [0.005]
Observations 129,948 8,181 121,763
Number of Firms 21,431 797 20,631
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Another way to check the robustness of the results is to use industry charac-
teristics and find if the decrease in financing constraints during periods of large
capital inflow is larger in industries in which financing constraints are assumed
to be more pervasive. Tornell and Westermann (2003) describe how there exists
an asymmetry in financing opportunities across tradeable and non-tradeables sec-
tors, given that the former have access to world capital markets and can use their
production as collateral to obtain funds, a possibility that the latter do not enjoy.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) propose an industry wide index that has been frequently
used to measure the differences in the need of external finance. A priory, indus-
tries that have a low dependence on external finance should experience a larger
relaxation of financial constraints during periods of large capital inflows. In this
paper, I calculate this index that is defined as the amount of desired investment
that cannot be financed through internal cash flows generated by the same firm. I
follow their approach and aggregate data on firms for the United States for each of
the different industries, as defined by Worldscope. The reason to use data from the
United States is that it is a good proxy for the demand for external funds in other
countries, given the large degree of financial development. I classify an industry
as been part of the high need for external finance if it lies above the median for the
calculated index. In Table 3.12, I show the industries used and the classification
among tradability and dependence on external finance groups.
In Table 3.13, the hypothesis that firms in non-tradable sectors experience a
higher decrease in financing constraints is confirmed. The interaction term be-
tween cashflow and the capital inflow dummy is only negative and significant for
this group of firms in countries with a low level of financial development. The
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results also show that the decreases in financing constraints are focalized in coun-
tries with a low degree of financial development and that produce in industries
with a low dependence on external finance. These results confirm the hypothesis
that capital inflow booms in low financial development economies are related to
decreases in financing constraints.
Table 3.13: Tradability and Access to External Finance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Tradables Non-Tradables High RZ Index Low RZ Index
Avg. q 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.034***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Cashflow 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.011***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow x Low Fin. Dev. 0.037*** 0.050*** 0.039*** 0.048***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
KI Boom 0.006** 0.004 0.005** 0.005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004]
Cashf x KI Boom -0.004*** -0.004** -0.005*** 0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev. 0.008 0.029*** 0.010* 0.031***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
Cash x KI Boom x Lo FinDev -0.005 -0.018*** -0.004 -0.025***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Observations 70,812 59,136 91,129 38,819
Number of Firms 12,016 9,415 15,256 6,175
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
An Instrumental Variable Approach The results provided assume that capital
inflow booms are independent of any idiosyncratic (firm level), time varying un-
observables at the firm level. The main assumption is that periods of large capital
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inflows can be used as a "natural experiment" in which the only firm level source
of variation that is not accounted for are the changes in financing conditions. How-
ever, this assumption can be challenged given that time varying unobservables can
be related to the capital inflow dummy. To correct for this possible endogeneity I
conduct an instrumental variable estimation.
The main idea is to relate the capital inflow boom dummy to a variable that is
exogenous to the rest of the dependent variables at the firm level for each coun-
try. As in Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) and the evidence presented in Figure 3.6,
global financing conditions (proxied by the real federal funds rate) affect the num-
ber of capital inflow boom episodes. In Table 3.14 I relate the capital inflow boom
dummy to the real federal funds rate (and up to three lags) and one lag of the real
deviation from long run trend of output12. Column (1) shows that the first lag
of real output deviation from long run trend increases the probability of a capital
inflow episode. However, lags one and two of the real federal funds rate are not
significant. Columns (2) and (3) show that an specification with only the first or the
second lag of the real interest rate are not significant either. As explained above,
the effect of the real interest rate in the probability of undergoing a capital inflow
boom is significant with a lag, in this case of three years. I use the specification
given in Column (4) of Table 3.14 to estimate the predicted value of the probabil-
ity of undergoing a capital inflow boom. Figure 3.9 shows the distribution of the
predicted values by the linear probability model specified.
To correct for possible endogeneity biasing the results, I replace the KI Boom
dummy in the specification in Equation 3.9 with the predicted values from the
12The instrumental variables estimation exclude the United States.
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Table 3.14: Instrumental Variables Approach: Auxiliary Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES KI Boom KI Boom KI Boom KI Boom
Real Fed. Funds Rate (-1) 0.005 0.003
[0.009] [0.005]
Real Fed. Funds Rate (-2) 0.012 -0.005
[0.015] [0.006]
Real Fed. Funds Rate (-3) -0.023** -0.012*
[0.011] [0.007]
Log-Real GDP Deviation from Trend (-1) 1.898*** 1.971*** 2.091*** 2.104***
[0.504] [0.466] [0.481] [0.498]
Constant 0.152*** 0.131*** 0.144*** 0.160***
[0.018] [0.014] [0.017] [0.018]
Observations 861 943 902 861
R2 0.025 0.016 0.017 0.022
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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model. Column (1) of Table 3.15 shows the results of replacing the continuous
fitted values for the capital inflow dummy. These findings show that even after
correcting for possible endogeneity, the main results still hold: an increase in the
probability of the instruments predicting a capital inflow boom decreases financing
constraints for firms in low financial development countries.
Table 3.15: Instrumental Variables Approach
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES LPM-Predict Top 15% Boom Region
Avg. q 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow -0.002 0.005*** 0.007***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.001]
KI Boom 0.119*** 0.005 -0.011***
[0.026] [0.004] [0.002]
Cashflow x Low Fin. Dev. 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.042***
[0.007] [0.003] [0.003]
Cash x KI Boom 0.045** 0.007*** 0.002
[0.017] [0.002] [0.001]
KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev. 0.038 0.022*** 0.038***
[0.031] [0.006] [0.005]
Cash x KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev -0.080* -0.017*** -0.012**
[0.043] [0.005] [0.005]
Observations 104,808 104,808 129,948
Number of Firms 17,654 17,654 21,431
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
However, the interpretation of this coefficient is not comparable with the find-
ings presented above. To correct for this possibility, using the fitted estimates ob-
tained in the auxiliary regression I define a capital inflow dummy as the observa-
tions for which the predicted values are in the top 15% of the predicted values.
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I select this cutoff percentile to have a similar percentage of fitted episodes than
in the baseline estimations. Column (2) shows that the triple interaction term is
still negative and significant. These results confirm that during periods of large
capital inflow booms, predicted by lagged global financing conditions and the real
growth rate of output, decrease financing constraints for firms in economies with
low financial development.
Finally another way to check if results are biased by changes in investment
opportunities at the firm level not captured by average q, I restrict capital inflow
episodes to periods in which more than 40% of the countries in the region are also
undergoing a capital inflow boom, regardless if the country in the specific year
was also undergoing a capital inflow boom. Using this definition there are a total
of 72 capital inflow boom periods and 46 of them are also categorized with the
benchmark classification. This change in the definition permits to isolate changes
in investment opportunities from overall changes in financing conditions. In other
words it allow to define capital inflow booms as only related to "push" rather than
"pull" factors. Column (3) of Table 3.15 shows that the main results do not change
when using this alternative specification.
More Robustness Tests If the difference in the degree of financial development is
responsible for the larger response in the decrease of financing constraints, redefin-
ing the sample to include less countries as classified as low financial development
should produce a larger coefficient in the triple interaction term and the findings
in the rest of robustness tests should not change. By redefining the high financial
development countries as those that have at least one (instead of at least two as
was defined above in the baseline results), four countries cross the threshold and
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are labeled as high financial development countries. These countries are Greece,
Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey.
Table 3.16 shows that the expected findings do not change after redefining the
countries between high and low financial development. The coefficient in the triple
interaction term is larger (−0.013 vs. −0.010) for the baseline definition of capital
inflow booms, using the net financial account to GDP ratio. The coefficients for
Column (2) and Column (3) do not change but the significance for the dummy of
capital inflow boom for the gross financial account increases.
Table 3.16: Robustness Check: Benchmark Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Net FA Gross FA Financial Flows
Avg. q 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow x Low Fin. Dev. 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
KI Boom 0.006*** 0.001 0.002
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow x KI Boom -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev. 0.017*** 0.008** 0.011***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
Cashflow x KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev -0.013*** -0.008** -0.007*
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Observations 129,948 129,948 129,948
Number of Firms 21,431 21,431 21,431
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the Column (1) of Table 3.17, excluding capital inflow booms that were not
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accompanied by financial reforms does not change the main results for the new
categorization between low and high financial development. In Column (2) the
triple interaction term using domestic credit booms to identify changes in financ-
ing conditions at the firm level does not result significant. Column (3) shows that
output booms do not change financing conditions either, as obtained in the bench-
mark results.
Table 3.17: Robustness Check: Financial Reforms, Credit and Output Booms
(1)









Cashflow x KI Boom -0.004***
[0.001]
KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev. 0.017***
[0.004]
Cashflow x KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev -0.010**
[0.005]
Observations 129,948
Number of Firms 21,431
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (1) of Table 3.18 shows that controlling for changes in investment op-
portunities proxied by average q, does not change the coefficient in the triple inter-
action term, implying that investment opportunities do not change significatively
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for low financial development economies during periods of large capital inflows.
Column (2) and Column (3) of Table 3.18 show that the triple interaction term is
only significant for firms that do not have access to American Depositary Receipts,
that are the ones with more financing constraints.
In Table 3.19 I show that the coefficients in the triple interaction increase, as
expected, for firms in the non-tradable sector and in industries with a low depen-
dence on external finance. As in the benchmark classification, for tradeables and
for firms located in industries with high dependence on external finance the triple
interaction term does not result significant.
Even though institutional features that determine the degree of financial de-
velopment are persistent, economies may evolve to a higher level over time. This
change is not represented in the time invariant measure used in this chapter. To
account for this possibility I use a measure of financial development proposed by
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009). Their financial development index com-
bines measures of the importance of credit to the private sector, deposits in the
financial sector, stock market capitalization, and the value of stocks traded. To use
this measure of financial development, I change the dummy variable that repre-
sents if a country is from a low financial development country with this continuous
and time varying measure.In Table 3.20 I show the marginal response of invest-
ment to a change in the cash flow to capital rate for the 25th and 75th percentiles
in the degree of financial development. The first column shows the response for
normal years and the second column for years of financial development. Results
show that for firms located in countries with a a lower level of financial develop-
ment, the response to the cash flow to capital is larger in both normal years as well
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Table 3.18: Robustness Check: Investment Opportunities and Access to External
Finance
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Invest. Opp. ADR No ADR
Avg. q 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.039***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
Cashflow 0.008*** -0.008*** 0.009***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
Cashflow x Low Fin. Dev. 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.049***
[0.003] [0.009] [0.004]
KI Boom 0.004* 0.025*** 0.005***
[0.002] [0.008] [0.002]
Cashf x KI Boom -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.003***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
Avg. q x KI Boom 0.004
[0.003]
Avg. q x Low Fin. Dev -0.006**
[0.003]
KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev. 0.019*** -0.009 0.020***
[0.005] [0.013] [0.005]
Avg. q x KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev 0.002
[0.006]
Cashf x KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev -0.014*** 0.012 -0.017***
[0.005] [0.011] [0.005]
Observations 129,948 8,181 121,763
Number of Firms 21,431 797 20,631
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.19: Robustness Check: Tradability and Access to External Finance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Tradables Non-Tradables High RZ Index Low RZ Index
Avg. q 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.034***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Cashflow 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.012***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cashflow x Low Fin. Dev. 0.040*** 0.058*** 0.043*** 0.056***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006]
KI Boom 0.007*** 0.005** 0.006** 0.007*
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004]
Cashf x KI Boom -0.004** -0.004** -0.005*** 0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
KI Boom x Low Fin. Dev. 0.007 0.030*** 0.008 0.034***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Cash x KI Boom x Lo FinDev -0.007 -0.021*** -0.006 -0.031***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
Observations 70,812 59,136 91,129 38,819
Number of Firms 12,016 9,415 15,256 6,175
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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as during capital inflow booms.The response of investment to the cash flow to cap-
ital rate does not result significant during a capital inflow boom for neither of the
percentile in the degree of financial development.
Table 3.20: Response of Investment to Cash flow to Capital for different Levels of
Financial Development





??? denotes 99% significance
Panel VAR methodology
Another way to disentangle the effect of financing constraints from changes in fun-
damentals at the firm level is a methodology that does not rely on a model specific
assumption but that relates the response of investment to different determinants
using a Structural Panel VAR, as described by Love and Zicchino (2006)13. This
methodology combines the traditional VAR approach with the control for the un-
observed heterogeneity at the firm level that allows to impose the restriction that
the structure for each cross-sectional unit is the same. Obtaining orthogonalized
responses to shocks in each of the variables in the system, this methodology per-
mits to separate the effects of the marginal profitability of investment from the
availability of internal funds that influence investment behavior. To control for
13In the Panel VAR calculation, the package by Love and Zicchino (2006) is used. In that paper,
the authors also relate the larger response of investment to financial variables at the firm level to
the degree of financial development. The value added of the results in this paper is to show that
during periods of large capital inflow, this robust relationship virtually dissapears.
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unobserved heterogeneity the procedure removes firm specific fixed effects by re-
defining each variable as the deviation from the forward mean. Another advan-
tage of this methodology is given by the fact that no strong structural assumptions,
other than the order in which variables at the firm level affect each other, is needed.
These strong assumptions are needed in other empirical approaches as the q the-
ory of investment. In other words, using this technique all variables in the system
are treated as endogenous.
In this paper, I use this methodology to capture the effect of financial variables
in investment, and to check if this relationship changes during periods of large
capital inflow. I propose the specification given in Equation 3.10 where Yit is com-
posed by average q as a measure of investment fundamentals (tobqdet), the cash
flow to capital ratio (cfkdet), as a proxy of internal funds, and the investment to
capital rate (invkdet).
Yit = Γ0 + Γ1Yit−1 + fi + dct + et (3.10)
i denotes Firm, c denotes country, and t year.
The structural assumption to obtain the orthogonalized responses is that av-
erage q only responds to the other variables in the system with a lag; cash flow
responds contemporaneously to average q, but to the investment to capital ratio
with a lag; and the investment to capital ratio responds contemporaneously to the
rest of the variables in the system but does not affect any variable contempora-
neously. In other words, the system ordering implies that average q is the most
exogenous of the variables in the system, and the investment to capital is the most
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endogenous. The specification includes one lag of each of the variables.
To control for firm level heterogeneity, this methodology removes the forward
mean for each firm, thus removing fixed effects at the firm level and allowing to
use lags of each of the variables as instruments in estimating the system by Gen-
eralized Method of Moments. The country-year specific effect dct is removed by
substracting the country-year mean value of each variable for each firm.
Results In Table 3.21 I show the result of the estimation for the model using the
complete sample for high and low levels of financial development. I focus on the
response of investment to the cash flow to capital rate14. In the Figure below, in
the top panels I show the response of investment to a one standard deviation inno-
vation in the cash flow to capital rate for firms in high and low financial develop-
ment economies along with the 5-95% confidence intervals of the point estimates
obtained using 1000 Montecarlo simulations from the empirical distribution of the
coefficients. These findings confirm that an increase in the cash flow to capital
ratio, that is not correlated to an increase in the marginal productivity of invest-
ment, increases investment both for firms in economies with high and low levels
of financial development. The response for firms in economies with a low level
of financial development is larger on impact but it is not significatively different
among the groups of countries for lags one to six.
In Table 3.22 I show the estimates of the Panel VAR conditioning the sample
to the periods of capital inflow booms. I test the hypothesis that the relationship
between an orthogonalized response to cash flow and investment changes dur-
14The complete set of results of the Panel VAR can be found in Appendix B. The impulse re-
sponses obtained result significant and with the expected sign.
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Table 3.21: Estimation Results Panel VAR Model: All Sample
High FD Low FD
tobqt cfkt invt tobqt cfkt invt
tobqt−1 .519 (93.9) .045 (3.69) .041 (17.52) .473 (42.75) .029 (3.34) .025 (6.71)
cfkt−1 .0097 (2.39) .262 (7.62) .015 (5.93) .088 (5.38) .497 (8.08) .038 (4.81)
invt−1 -.039 (-3.65) -.051 (-1.81) .217 (30.29) -.039 (-1.62) -.173 (-4.45) .22 (19.57)
Obs. 66,900 15,851
Note: t-stats in parenthesis. GMM estimation. Country-time and firm fixed effects are controlled for
prior to estimation. .
Table 3.22: Estimation Results Panel VAR Model: KI Boom
High FD Low FD
tobqt cfkt invt tobqt cfkt invt
tobqt−1 .43 (14.95) .051(0.74) .061 (4.76) .53 (9.17) -.041 (-0.712) .038 (1.82)
cfkt−1 .003 (0.17) .206(2.12) .028 (1.76) .047 (1.75) .296 (2.95) -.025 (-1.85)
invt−1 -.004(-0.11) .016(0.15) .251 (7.37) -.081(-.83) .13 /6 (1.21) .406 (8.70)
Obs. 3,014 839
Note: t-stats in parenthesis. GMM estimation. Country-time and firm fixed effects are controlled for
prior to estimation.
ing periods of large capital inflow. In the bottom panels of the Figure, I show the
impulse response of this specification: the positive and significant relationship be-
tween investment and firms’ internal funds is not significant for countries with
a low level of financial development15. These results suggests that the effect of
capital inflow booms is to decrease the reliance on internal funds, and thus relax
borrowing constraints. I conduct the same experiment but using in the specifica-
tion the sales-to-capital ratio as a proxy for investment opportunities and results
do not change.
15These results are corroborated using ths sales to capital ratio as the proxy of investment oppor-
tunities (instead of Tobin’s Q) and shown in the Figure below.
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Figure: Impulse Response of
Investment to Cash Flow (Tobin’s q)
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Figure: Impulse Response of
Investment to Cash Flow (Sales-to-Capital)
Response of invkdet to cfkdet shock
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3.4 Summary of Empirical Results
In this chapter, I study the relationship between country level financial develop-
ment, financial constraints at the firm level, and large capital inflow periods. The
empirical findings show that macroeconomic and firm level behavior during cap-
ital inflow periods are more volatile in economies with a low level of financial
development, relative to countries with a high level of financial development. Pe-
riods of large capital inflow are used as an exogenous change in financing condi-
56
tions, that are not related homogeneously to changes in investment opportunities,
to unveil the relationship between financial development and aggregate and firm
level responses. This experiment is motivated by the exogenous nature that capital
inflow booms represent for a single firm.
I show that firms in countries with a low level of financial development exhibit
a loosening in the cost of borrowing, coupled with an appreciation in asset prices,
and a decrease in financial constraints during periods of large capital inflow. Us-
ing q-investment regressions and a firm level Panel VAR the hypothesis that finan-
cial development is related to the extent to which financial constraints affect firm
level behavior is corroborated. Moreover, I show how financial constraints at the
firm level are loosened during periods of capital inflows for firms in low financial
development countries. This decrease in financing constraints is larger for firms
in the non-tradable sector of the economy, for firms operating in industries with
a larger reliance in internal finance, and not present during periods of domestic
credit booms, which confirms that the findings are related to the relationship be-
tween financing conditions and not because of other unobserved factors. These
findings are robust to multiple specifications and robustness tests.
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Chapter 4
Financial Development and Credit
Frictions at the Firm Level: An
Analytical Framework
The main goal of this chapter is to relate the larger response evidenced in macro-
economic aggregates and at the firm level in emerging economies during periods
of large capital inflow, described in chapter 3, to the degree of financial develop-
ment and the pervasiveness of financial constraints. I define the degree of finan-
cial development as the extent to which debtors, due to limited commitment, can
use their assets measured at their market value to secure debt. In the model, in an
economy with a low level of financial development, a larger share of borrowers are
restricted by creditors to use a lower fraction of their assets to raise debt, relative
to an economy with a higher degree of financial development. The response to a
changing economic environment is distorted for firms that are ex-ante constrained.
I highlight a transmission channel in which endogenous increases in the aggregate
price of capital relaxes borrowing constraints for constrained firms during these
periods.
The empirical regularities around periods of large capital inflow, described in
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chapter 3 motivate the use of a dynamic, stochastic, heterogeneous agents’ model
of a Small Open Economy (SOE) with a financial friction, to highlight the inter-
action between financial development, firm investment decisions, and borrow-
ing constraints. In particular, the degree of financial development determines the
share of constrained firms in equilibrium, and thus the reaction to changes in the
economic environment, both at the firm level and on macroeconomic aggregates.
Countries in which there is a higher degree of financial development experience
smaller reactions to equivalent changes in global financing conditions. On the
other hand countries where there are more financially constrained agents show
larger increases in investment due to the possibility of increasing debt given by
the relaxation of borrowing constraints after an endogenous increase in aggregate
asset prices.
In the proposed experiment I compare the transition between steady states of
economies with varying degrees of financial development, after an exogenous
change in the foreign determined interest rate. Periods of large capital inflow
are related to looser global financial conditions1. Thus, a decrease in the foreign-
determined interest rate (and because agents use foreign debt to finance consump-
tion and investment) leads to an aggregate capital inflow and increases in the ag-
gregate capital stock. Through this mechanism, large capital inflow periods are
related to increases in firm level and macroeconomic aggregates that differ as the
degree of financial development changes.
The analytical framework I propose to describe the role of financial develop-
1Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) find a lagged response in the probability of a capital flow bonanza
to the U.S. real short-term interest rate, as well as low GDP growth in large economies, and increases
in commodity prices.
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ment around capital inflow booms, uses features from the heterogeneous agent,
and incomplete markets literature developed by Aiyagari (1993) and Huggett (1993),
with the addition of a borrowing constraint of the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) type.
These characteristics imply that in the proposed setting markets are not only in-
complete but also imperfect. The model differs from the Aiyagari-Huggett frame-
work because the return to savings is given by the world determined interest rate,
a common assumption when studying Small Open Economies (SOE). The presence
of convex capital adjustment costs gives rise to a price of capital different to unity.
The specification proposed uses several features from the one used by Mendoza
(2010), albeit that one is used to describe a representative agent SOE.
The purpose of using this framework is to compare the behavior of two economies
that only differ in the degree of financial development to an aggregate shock that
endogenously produces a surge in capital inflows. To obtain this dynamic, in the
model I solve for the transition between steady states of an heterogeneous agents
economy, characterized by borrowing constrained and unconstrained firms, after
an unexpected change in the exogenous real interest rate. In the next section I de-
scribe the theoretical model and describe the main transmission channels by which
the period of large capital inflows decrease financing constraints at the firm level.
Also I define the stationary and the transition recursive equilibrium that charac-
terize the aggregates and firm levels dynamics. In section 4.2 I describe the para-
meterization procedure, baseline results, and robustness tests to the main results.
The last section concludes.
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4.1 The Firm-Household Problem
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived, self-employed, firm-
households of mass one2. Preferences are defined over consumption (ct) of one
tradable good and the supply of labor (lt). The specification uses Epstein (1983)
Stationary Cardinal Utility (SCU), that permits the model to be characterized by a
unique, invariant distribution of foreign assets under incomplete markets by fea-
turing an endogenous rate of time preference3. Preferences for each agent are given
by4:
























where u (.) is a standard concave, and twice differentiable period utility function
and v (.) is an increasing, concave and twice differentiable time preference func-
tion. In order to eliminate the wealth effect on labor supply, the specification uses
the functional form proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988).
This assumption implies that the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and labor is independent of consumption. The parameter ω > 1 determines
the elasticity of labor supply.
Production of the tradable good by each of the agents is defined by a constant
returns to scale production function that takes as inputs fixed capital (kt) and labor
(lt), and is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. These shocks, labeled zt are
2A decentralization of the model, specifying consumer and firm’s behavior, in which the former
own equity of the latter, yields the same results that using the proposed setting.
3In subsection 4.2.6 I explain with more detail the reasons for using the Stational Cardinal Utility
(SCU) and implications of using an exogenous discount rate.
4Lucas and Stokey (1984) state: "The hypothesis of increasing marginal impatience, appears to
be an essential component that any theory within the class considered in this paper must posess
if it is to generate dynamics under which wealth distributions converge to determinate, stationary
equilibria in which all agents have positive wealth and consumption levels".
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the only source of uncertainty of the model economy, are i.i.d. across agents, and
follow an auto-regressive process for each agent. The production function F (k, l)
has the usual properties:
F′k > 0, F
′
l > 0, F
′
kk < 0, F
′
ll < 0
Investment is subject to adjustment costs determined by a linearly homoge-
neous function Ψ (it, kt) where Ψ (.)
′ > 0. Each firm-household chooses sequences
of consumption (ct), labor supply (lt), capital (kt+1), investment (it) and holdings
of one period, non-contingent, bonds (bt+1), taking as given the exogenous gross
return on bonds R, and the endogenous market price of capital (qt).
The period budget constraint and the capital accumulation equations are given
by:
ct + it (1+Ψ (it, kt)) + bt+1 = ezt F (kt, lt) + btR (4.2)
it = kt+1 − (1− δ) kt (4.3)
The credit market is imperfect because foreign lenders require the firm-household
to guarantee the debt by offering fixed capital, measured at its market value as
collateral. The collateral constraint implies that debt cannot exceed a fraction, de-
noted by κ, of the market value of fixed capital. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
creditors protect themselves from the possibility of the borrower’s repudiation of
the debt contract and never allow the size of debt to exceed a share of the mar-
ket value of collateral. In the setting presented in this model, the differences in
the fraction of collateralizable debt will denote differences in the enforcement ca-
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pability of lenders to recuperate the collateral and thus is related to the degree of
financial development. In short, a higher value of κ implies a more developed
financial system, in the sense that agents can use a higher proportion of their as-
sets to obtain loans. The fraction (1− κ) represents the amount of fixed capital
that the household firm would be able to retain after repudiating the debt contract,
and therefore κ is a proxy of the level of financial development. The borrowing
constraint is given by:
bt+1 ≥ −κqtkt+1 (4.4)
The optimality conditions with respect to consumption, labor, bond holdings,
the demand for capital, investment and the complementarity slackness condition
are given by:
λt = Uct
lω−1t = Fl (kt, lt)
λt − ηt = REt (λt+1)
χt − κηtqt = Et
{




1+Ψ (it, kt) + itΨ′i (it, kt)
)
ηt [bt+1 + κqtkt+1] = 0
where λt is the marginal utility of an extra unit of lifetime consumption, ηt is the
multiplier attached to the borrowing constraint (Equation 4.4), and χt denotes the
shadow value of an extra unit of investment.
If F (., .) and ψ (., .) are linearly homogeneous and the firm is a price taker in
its output market, the shadow value of a marginal unit of capital is equal to the
market value of existing capital to its replacement cost, a result shown by Hayashi










[ezt+1 F1 (kt+1, lt+1)− it+1Ψk (it+1, kt+1) + qt+1 (1− δ)]
}
(4.5)
The firm-household’s discount factor is distorted, for constrained agents, by the
presence of the collateral constraint. The mass of constrained agents is then a func-
tion of the financial development variable, κ a result that I show quantitatively.
Proposition 1 The distortion to the pricing kernel of firm’s demand for capital ampli-
fies shocks to each agent’s demand.
Proof. In order for the pricing kernel to amplify shocks (1− κη̃t) should be less
than one and greater than zero.
From the first order conditions,






1− η̃t ≤ 1− κη̃t
given that, 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1




and κ ≥ 0
Defining Ωt+i+1 ≡ λt+i+1λt+i(1−η̃t+iκ)
, and using transversality condition, the for-
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where dt+j+1 denotes dividends of the firms. This implies that the expectation
that the constraint could bind in the future, also distort the demand for capital in
equilibrium.
The supply of capital for each agent can be obtained using the first order con-
dition with respect to investment. After aggregating each agent’s supply of capital
for a given price, the aggregate market supply of capital, taken as given by each of
the agents, is denoted by:
qt = 1+Ψ(It, Kt) + ItΨ′i(It, Kt) (4.6)
where It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt, and Kt =
∫
kt µt (kt, bt, zt) ∀t. The distribution of
agents, denoted by µt (kt, bt, zt) determines the aggregate state that is relevant in
the formation of the price of capital. In the setting proposed agents need to keep
track of the aggregate level of the capital stock, because when solving their prob-
lem they take the price of fixed capital qt as given.
4.1.1 Transmission Channel
After an exogenous shock that lowers the opportunity cost of capital, agents that
are borrowing constrained at the initial level of asset prices qt, are not able to in-
crease their debt level to finance the desired increase in capital. However, firms
that are not constrained can freely increase their demand for capital. Because the
supply of capital is upward sloping, the aggregate price of capital qt increases, re-
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Figure 4.1: Market for Aggregate Capital and Amplification Effect
laxing the borrowing constraint for ex-ante constrained firms and causing these
agents to increase the aggregate demand for capital further. This transmission
channel is summarized in Figure 4.1.
The lack of a closed form solution to this model, featuring a non-linear trans-
mission mechanism, the interaction between constrained and unconstrained agents,
in which the size of constrained and unconstrained agents are endogenously de-
termined, requires the solution of the model using a numerical approximation to
the competitive equilibrium.
4.1.2 Recursive Representation
The proposed model can be expressed in recursive form using the following spec-
ification. Denote a ≡ {b, k} as the agent specific set of endogenous states and z
represent the idiosyncratic shock. The problem can then be written as the solution
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to the value function for an agent characterized by state (a, z):























subject to the following constraints,
s.t. c = ezF (k, l)− i(1+Ψ (i, k)) + bR− b′ (a, z) (4.8)
i = k′ (a, z)− (1− δ) k (4.9)





taking as given the market supply of capital and the evolution of aggregate capital:
q = 1+Ψ′
(
K′ − (1− δ)K
K
) (













(a, z) µ′ (a, z)
Definition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of policy functions b′ (a, z; R, K),
and k′ (a, z; R, K), value function V (a, z), an invariant probability distribution µ (a, z),
the price of capital q (K′, K), such that given the gross interest rate R, the level of financial
development κ, and a Markov process for the exogenous shock with transition probability
matrix Π (z, z′):
1. The decision rules b′ (a, z; R, K), k′ (a, z; R, K), and the value function V (a, z; R, K)
solve the programming problem given by Equation 4.7 subject to the constraints
given by Equations 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10, taking as given q (K′, K), R, and the Markov
67
process.













3. The average value of K′ and K implied by the average of the firm-households decisions








k′ (a, z) = K
4. The price of capital, q (K′, K) satisfies Equation 4.11 and coincides with the price
taken as given by individual agents.
5. Goods market clears.
Given that K′ = K in the stationary recursive steady state, the price of capital is
constant. The stationary equilibrium provides useful information about how the
degree of financial development distorts the policy functions and the distribution
of agents. The model determines endogenously the proportion of agents that will
be borrowing constrained given the exogenous process for the shock, the financial
development variable κ and the gross interest rate. However, a more interesting
question that can be solved using this model is, how does the (changing) market
price of capital influences the borrowing constraint and in turn the policy func-
tions across an equilibrium path. This can be obtained by solving the transitional
dynamics between steady states for two different values of the gross interest rate.
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In the transition between steady states, an agent’s problem is given by:
















Et [Vt+1 (at+1, zt+1)]
}
(4.12)
subject to the following constraints,
s.t. ct = ezt F (kt, Lt)− it(1+Ψ (it, kt)) + btR− bt+1 (4.13)
it = kt+1 (at, zt)− (1− δ) kt (4.14)
bt+1 (at, zt) ≥ −κqt (Kt+1, Kt) kt+1 (4.15)
taking as given:
qt = 1+Ψ (It, Kt) + ItΨ′ (It, Kt) (4.16)
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
Definition 2 A competitive equilibrium transition path consists of decision rules b′t (at, zt; R, Kt),
k′t (at, zt; R, Kt), and value functions Vt (a, z), probability distributions µt (at, zt), pricing
function qt (Kt+1), for t = 0, .., ∞ such that given the gross interest rate R, the level of
financial development κ, and a Markov process for the exogenous shock with transition
probability matrix Π (zt, zt+1):
1. The decision rules and value functions solve the agents’ problem Equations 4.12,
4.13, 4.14 , 4.15 given an initial distribution µ0
(
a0, z0; R0, K0
)
and the evolution of
the price of capital Equation 4.16.
2. The sequence of distributions is consistent with the decision rules and the transition
matrix:
µt+1 (at+1, zt+1) =
∫
a,z
µt (at, zt)Π (zt, zt+1)
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µt+1 (at+1, zt+1) kt+1 (at, zt)
4. The price of capital satisfies Equation 4.16 and coincides with the price taken as given
by individual agents.
5. Goods market clears.
The equilibrium policy functions and distributions in steady state, and during
the transition, can be used to calculate the dynamics of market aggregates between
steady states characterized by different levels of the exogenous interest rates.5
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Functional Forms and Calibration
The functional forms adopted for the utility function follows Epstein’s Stationary
Cardinal Utility, where u (.), the period utility function and v (.), the endogenous

























The elasticity of the endogenous rate of time preference with respect to the
5The solution procedure to solve for the recursive equilibrium for the stationary and transitional
equilibrium is described in Appendix C.
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where c̄ and l̄ are given by the average deterministic average of consumption and
labor supply6. This implies a steady state gross discount rate equal to the inverse
of the gross interest rate. The value of consumption in steady state is calibrated
to obtain the mean value of bond holdings that matches the mean value of the
leverage ratio obtained for firm level data from chapter 3. This implies that average
debt holdings in steady state are equal to close to 43% of the market value of assets.
The main goal of the quantitative exercise is to observe how different levels of
financing constraints match the behavior observed in macroeconomic aggregates
around periods of large capital inflow. Therefore I use functional forms and pa-
rameter values for the technological parameters used in the small open economy
literature for the quantitative exercises. The functional form for the firm’s pro-
duction function is Cobb-Douglas and the share of capital in total production is
denoted by α. The adjustment costs function takes the following form:







The productivity shock process is modeled as a first order Markov chain:











− δk̄+ b̄ (R− 1) where l and k are the steady state solutions
of the first order conditions.
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The last two parameters to be determined are the real foreign determined inter-
est rate R and the share of the value of assets that can be collateralized, given by κ.
The initial steady state value for the interest rate is 4%, and the proposed experi-
ment is a reduction of 25 basis points, that matches the surge in capital inflow from
the event analysis in chapter 3. Given that one of the main the objectives of the
paper is to compare equilibriums for different degrees of financial development,
different values for the parameter κ are used. For the transition, the experiment
proposed is one where the value of the interest rate changes, causing the economy
to move from one steady state to another highlighting how this dynamics may
differ for economies characterized by different values of κ.
Table (4.1) summarizes the benchmark calibration of the model. As noted above
these parameter values are standard in the SOE literature.
Table 4.1: Parameterization
Preferences Technology
σ ω β α φ ρ σz δ
2 1.445 0.1118 0.32 2 0.42 0.0129 0.10
4.2.2 Stationary Equilibrium
The lack of closed form solution requires the model to be solved using numerical
methods. In particular, the model is solved using a discretization of the state space
in evenly spaced grids for the state variables, and solving for the optimal policy
functions using value function iteration. The stationary distribution is solved for
using the policy functions and the transition matrix for the shock process. Fig-
ure 4.2 shows the unconditional stationary distribution of agents over bond hold-
ings for an economy in which firms are not subject to the collateral constraint (per-
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fect credit markets). The unconditional distribution of capital is shown in Fig-
ure 4.3.
The aim of the proposed experiment is to compare how economies with dif-
ferent degrees of financial development react to a shock in the returns to the ag-
gregate cost of debt. One of the core hypothesis is that for an economy with suffi-
ciently high level of financial development, in the stationary steady state, no agents
should be borrowing constrained, and the percentage of constrained agents, de-
picted in the Figure as the spike in the left side of the distribution over bond hold-
ings, should increase as financial development decreases. Figure 4.4 illustrates this
result, and shows the stationary unconditional distribution of bond holdings for
different levels of financial development.
As the value of κ diminishes from 0.7 to 0.35, the benchmark values used for
high and low level of financial development respectively, the percentage of con-
strained agents, increases to close to 15% of agents. These distributions illustrate
that the endogenous discount factor supports a distribution of agents around the
average value of bond holdings in which ad hoc limits in assets do not play any
role. However with a constant discount rate strictly greater than the interest rate,
a condition needed to support a well defined stationary distribution, the share
of constrained agents would not depend solely on the degree of financial devel-
opment but also on the exogenous debt limit and on the difference between the
discount rate and the exogenous interest rate. subsection 4.2.6 presents the results
using exogenous discounting and clarifies further why the stationary cardinal uil-
ity specification is desirable to explain the transmission channel described in the
model.
73
Figure 4.2: Unconditional Distribution over Bond Holdings (Perfect Credit Market)













Figure 4.3: Unconditional Distribution over Capital (Perfect Credit Market)














Figure 4.4: Bond Holding Distribution for different degrees of Financial Develop-
ment
The left panel of Figure 4.5 shows the cumulative stationary distribution of
capital holdings as a function of current capital holdings. The Figure shows that
for firms in a low financial development environment, a larger share of agents
hold a lower level of capital in steady state, an effect of a more restrictive financial
constraint. In the right panel of Figure 4.5, the cumulative distribution around
the level of debt for an economy with a high level of financial development is
distributed uniformly around the average level of debt holdings as there are no
constrained agents. However, the cumulative distribution of bond holdings for an
economy with a low level of financial development shows that for a significant
share of the state space for bonds the percentage of agents is zero and at the point
at which the constraint does not bind, the share of agents is more than 10%. The
behavior of these agents, that are not able to adjust freely their desired level of
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Figure 4.5: Capital and Bond Demand Functions for High and Low FD
bonds and capital plays a key role in the proposed transmission channel.
The financing constraint plays a role in determining average holdings of capital
and bonds from firms. I show the average level of capital and debt, as a percentage
of the average for perfect credit markets, and the leverage ratio in Table 4.2. The
difference in aggregate value of capital is close to 2% less for the lowest value of
κ. As the degree of financial development increases, the average value of capital
approaches the perfect credit market value. The demand for bonds shows a larger
difference for different levels of financing constraints. For the lowest level of fi-
nancial development, average demand for bonds is close to 62% and it gets close
to the perfect capital market value for values of κ = 0.6. In the third column, the
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average level of leverage for the lowest level of financial development is close to
the constraint, but as the level of financial development increases, less agents are
constrained, implying that there is a larger difference between the value of κ and
the average level of leverage.
Table 4.2: Steady State Capital, Bonds, and Leverage
Capital Bonds Leverage
κ = 0.30 0.978 0.623 0.275
κ = 0.35 0.984 0.711 0.312
κ = 0.40 0.989 0.785 0.343
κ = 0.45 0.992 0.843 0.368
κ = 0.50 0.994 0.896 0.390
κ = 0.55 0.998 0.950 0.412
κ = 0.60 1.000 0.991 0.428
κ = 0.65 1.000 0.999 0.432
κ = 0.70 1.000 1.000 0.432
4.2.3 Dynamic Responses
The experiment proposed assumes that there is a 25 basis points decrease in the
foreign interest rate. In the experiment, I assume that for each of the agents the
productivity shock remains at its steady state value through the transition, even
though the distribution of agents is still determined by the specified shock process.
This assumption allows to separate the decrease in costs of borrowing from differ-
ences in investment opportunities at the firm level.
After an unexpected and permanent fall in the foreign interest rate, there is an
increase in the demand for capital for all firms. This increase causes the uncondi-
tional distribution of capital to shift to the right in the new final steady state, as
Figure 4.6 illustrates7. The shape of the distribution over the capital stock does
7The benchmark degree of financial development will be κ = 0.35 to denote low financial de-
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Figure 4.6: Initial and Final Distribution over Capital Holdings
not change significatively. The initial and final distribution over bond holdings is
depicted in Figure 4.7. In the final distribution, there are less constrained agents in
equilibrium, due to the increase in the level of capital that increases the possibility
to raise debt.
The exogenous decrease in the interest rate causes a different effect on the tran-
sition for an economy with high and low financial development. Before exam-
ining the response in macroeconomic aggregates, it is interesting to illustrate the
evolution of the distribution of bond holdings after the shock. In Figure 4.8, the
cumulative distribution over bond holdings is depicted for the initial steady state,
the period of the shock and up to two periods after the shock. This Figure shows
velopment, and κ = 0.7 for high financial development. For the initial and final distributions over
bond holdings and capital the distribution for the low level of financial development is depicted.
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Figure 4.7: Initial and Final Distribution over Bond Holdings
how the relaxation in financing constraints allows firms to demand a higher level
of debt after the shock, as the shift to the left in the cumulative distribution for
each of the periods shows. This effect gradually disappears and the distribution
of bonds in the new steady state is similar to the initial distribution for low levels
of debt. As was explained above, the capital accumulation in the transition to the
new steady state by firms with a low level of debt permits to sustain a larger level
of debt holdings in the new steady state equilibrium.
The differential effect in macroeconomic aggregates is illustrated in Figure 4.9.
For an economy with a low level of financial development, there is a stronger re-
action in macroeconomic aggregates. The proposed transmission channel causes
that firms that are ex-ante constrained, can increase their demand for capital closer
to the desired level. Moreover, given the distortion in the marginal productivity
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Figure 4.8: Cumulative Bond Holding Distribution after Shock
80
Figure 4.9: Response of Macroeconomic Aggregates for Low and High Degree of
Financial Development
of an extra unit of investment, the response of constrained agents is amplified. In
the aggregate, these effects are evidenced in a larger reaction in the price of capital,
output, gross aggregate investment, and a surge in capital inflows, evidenced as
an increase in the financial account. The difference in the latter, as a percent of out-
put is close to one percent, even with output increasing more in an economy with
lower financial development. There is also a larger increase in gross aggregate in-
vestment (close to 2% larger), and in the price of aggregate capital after the shock
(half a percent larger). These findings shows how a model with varying degrees of
financial development can explain the difference in aggregate response to periods
of large capital inflows evidenced in emerging economies.
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Figure 4.10: Response of Macroeconomic Aggregates for Mid and High Degree of
Financial Development
As the level of financial development increases, the amplification effect is less
pronounced. In Figure 4.10, I show how increasing the parameter that denotes the
level of financial development to κ = 0.55, the difference in the response of macro-
economic aggregates is not as stark as the one described above. For the financial
account, this difference in response changes from close to one percent of output,
to less than half a percent. The behavior of output, gross aggregate investment,
and the price of capital is also similar. These results confirm that the amplification
evidenced in economies with varying degrees of financial development can be at-
tributed to the behavior of financially constrained agents reacting to a relaxation
in these constraints.
The amplified response for constrained firms can be explained showing the
82
difference in behavior for a firm starting from the same leverage ratio in an en-
vironment of high and low financial development. I show the response of a firm
with a leverage ratio close to 0.35 in an economy in which this is the value of the
parameter κ (low financial development), and for one in which this parameter is
equal to 0.7 (high financial development) in Figure 4.11. A firm operating in the
high financial development environment can increase the leverage ratio without
the constraint being binding. This produces that there is an increase in firm’s in-
vestment due to the increase in it’s demand for capital, an increase in consumption,
given by the permanent decrease in the foreign interest rate, that is freely financed
with an increase in debt. However, for a firm operating in an environment with
low financial development, as it tries to increase it’s capital stock through increas-
ing debt, the constraint binds. The amplified response in the demand for capital
is presented in the top right panel. Given that the firm is ex-ante constrained, the
increase in the aggregate price of capital allows the firm to invest on impact and
to get closer to the level of capital that would prevail if the constraint were absent.
As the constraint becomes binding for a higher level of capital and debt, the in-
vestment rate falls abruptly presenting a higher variation. The optimal decision
rule for a constrained firm shows how consumption decisions are also distorted
and constrained agents cannot adjust it as if they were in an unconstrained envi-
ronment. The bottom right panel shows that these differences are explained by the
possibility that agents in an environment with high financial development have to
adjust debt freely, whereas for a firm with low financial development, this is not
possible.
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Figure 4.11: Response of Firm Level variables for different degrees of Financial
Development
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4.2.4 Aggregate Amplification Effect
To measure the aggregate amplification effect that affects firms that are ex-ante
constrained, and due to the increase in the aggregate price of capital experience a
relaxation in their financial constraint, I conduct an experiment in which the steady
state price of capital is the one used to measure the value of the capital stock, and
thus to collateralize debt. In Figure 4.12, I show the macroeconomic responses for
an economy with low financial development and in which the relevant price for the
financial constraint is the market determined, to one in which the relevant price is
the steady state price. In other words, I analyze the different behavior due to the
characteristic that capital is marked-to-market in determining the value of collateral
to secure debt. As the Figure shows, the aggregate amplification effect is important
in determining the response of economies with low financial development. The
pecuniary externality described in the transmission channel in Figure 4.1, produces
a significative difference in the response of macroeconomic aggregates.
However, this amplification effect due to the externality decreases as the level
of financial development increases, given that the share of constrained agents in
equilibrium that are affected by the increase in the aggregate price of capital de-
creases as the share of collateralizable assets decreases, as I show in Figure 4.13.
The initial increase in aggregate investment is up to 1.50% larger for an economy
in which the value of collateral is measured using the market value, than with the
steady state price of capital. For economies with a high level of financial devel-
opment, characterized by a lower proportion of constrained agents, the difference
becomes negligible.
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Figure 4.12: Response of Macroeconomic Aggregates (Amplification Effect)
4.2.5 Robustness Checks
A key parameter, that determines the price elasticity of the supply of capital, and
thus the reaction in aggregate investment, is related to the adjustment costs that
firms face. From Equation 4.16 and using the proposed functional form for the
capital adjustment costs, this elasticity is given 1φ . A lower value of φ implies a
larger response in aggregate investment after the initial shock, and there would be
less adjustment in the price of aggregate capital, for the same increase in the aggre-
gate demand for capital. These findings can be confirmed by comparing the initial
percentage deviations from steady states values in aggregate investment and the
aggregate price of capital in Table 4.3 and 4.4. After the initial shock, the increase
in investment is larger for lower values of the adjustment costs parameter, and
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Figure 4.13: Initial Increase in Aggregate Investment
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there is a higher adjustment of the increase in the aggregate demand for capital
through the price level. This result is consistent for different degrees of financial
development as the different rows in the Tables show.
Table 4.3: Initial increase in Investment: Robustness Check
φ = 1.5 φ = 1.75 φ = 1.90 φ = 2.00 φ = 2.10 φ = 2.25 φ = 2.50
κ = 0.3 11.34 11.38 11.48 12.09 10.99 11.58 10.08
κ = 0.4 13.64 12.57 12.00 12.12 12.58 12.55 10.98
κ = 0.5 13.40 12.41 11.79 11.86 11.74 11.79 11.84
κ = 0.6 11.35 10.83 10.90 10.64 10.52 10.38 10.11
κ = 0.7 11.24 10.78 10.74 10.56 10.40 10.19 9.71
Table 4.4: Initial increase in Price of Capital: Robustness Check
φ = 1.5 φ = 1.75 φ = 1.90 φ = 2.00 φ = 2.10 φ = 2.25 φ = 2.50
κ = 0.3 1.66 1.92 2.09 2.31 2.18 2.45 2.33
κ = 0.4 2.02 2.13 2.19 2.32 2.52 2.67 2.55
κ = 0.5 1.98 2.10 2.15 2.26 2.34 2.50 2.76
κ = 0.6 1.66 1.82 1.98 2.02 2.09 2.19 2.34
κ = 0.7 1.65 1.81 1.95 2.01 2.06 2.15 2.24
4.2.6 Exogenous Discounting
In this section, I compare the results obtained with a version of the model that does
not feature endogenous discounting. The approach with exogenous discounting
requires a constant rate of time preference higher than the foreign interest rate to
obtain a well defined stationary equilibrium. In particular, Equation 4.1 in this
version of the model is expressed as:












where β ≡ 11+θ , and θ > r denotes the rate of time preference8. The distribution
of wealth in the stationary equilibrium in this case is affected by the endogenous
8With 1+r1+θ ≥ 1, assets diverge to infinity in stationary steady state because marginal utility
converges to zero, and with CRRA preferences this implies that consumption, and therefore assets,
diverge to infinity.
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borrowing limit. Given that agents would not want to accumulate debt up to a
point in which they have a large probability of the constraint to bind, precaution-
ary savings affect the entire wealth distribution, and not only the proportion of
agents that hit the constraint. On the contrary, stationary cardinal utility allows for
the endogenous borrowing constraint to remain binding in the stationary equilib-
rium and only the share of agents that are borrowing constrained is affected by the
proportion of the market value of assets that can be collateralized.
The distribution of bond holdings for different values of κ is depicted in Fig-
ure 4.14. These findings show that the entire stationary distribution of agents over
bond holdings changes for different values of κ9. The precautionary savings mo-
tive shifts the distribution to the right as the value of κ decreases. This result im-
plies a different response not only from constrained agents, but also from uncon-
strained agents as stationary holdings of assets is distorted in equilibrium. This
is the main reason why the stationary cardinal utility specification is preferred for
the analysis proposed.
In Table 4.5 the results from the above Figure can be confirmed. The average
leverage ratio (measuring capital at its market value) changes with the value of
the parameter κ. This is not the case for the SCU specification as is described in
Table 4.2. The difference in the entire wealth distribution causes a change in one
of the main findings obtained with SCU. In particular, the response in macroeco-
nomic aggregates is larger for an economy with a higher degree of financial devel-
opment as is depicted in Figure 4.15. However these findings are expected given
9In order to be able to make a comparison the main parameters are set at their baseline values.
The exogenous discount rate β is set at 0.958 to obtain a median value of assets comparable with
the SCU case.
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Figure 4.14: Steady States for different degrees of Financial Development (Exoge-
nous Discounting)
that the difference between the distributions cause that a higher degree of finan-
cial development causes an increase in debt holdings and the elasticity of the asset
position to changes in interest rates are higher when debt is levels are larger.
Table 4.5: Steady State Capital, Bonds, and Leverage with Exogenous Discounting
Capital Bonds Leverage
κ = 0.30 3.161 -1.004 0.289
κ = 0.40 3.183 -1.350 0.385
κ = 0.50 3.206 -1.698 0.482
κ = 0.60 3.231 -2.055 0.578
κ = 0.70 3.246 -2.399 0.672
κ = 0.80 3.264 -2.759 0.768
The main transmission channel proposed, by which the increase in the mar-
ket price of capital permits a share of agents to increase their debt holdings and
finance a larger level of investment, is not affected changing the specification to
exogenous discounting. Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 show that when the borrow-
ing constraint is measured using the steady state value of assets, the increase in
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Figure 4.15: Response of Macroeconomic Aggregates for High and Low level of
Financial Development (Exogenous Discounting)















Fin. Account / Output
Low Fin. Dev
High Fin. Dev



















































macroeconomic aggregates is less than when the market value of assets is used in
the borrowing constraints. These results confirm that the transmission channel is
present regardless of the specification of the discount rate.
4.3 Conclusions
The theoretical analysis shows how the level of financial development, represented
in the model using the share of assets that can be collateralized, influences the share
of agents that are borrowing constrained in equilibrium. The proposed experiment
examines the transition equilibrium of a heterogeneous agents economy given a
permanent and unexpected change in the foreign determined interest rate.
The dynamic response to this aggregate shock affects differently economies in
which financing constraints are more pervasive. This amplification in the aggre-
91
Figure 4.16: Aggregate Amplification Effect Low Financial Development (Exoge-
nous Discounting)
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Figure 4.17: Dynamic Amplification Effect High Financial Development (Exoge-
nous Discounting)
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gate response is composed of two effects. Given that firms face an upward slop-
ing supply of capital, a shock that induces unconstrained firms to invest causes
increases in the aggregate price of capital. This produces a relaxation of the bor-
rowing constraint for constrained firms. The second effect is related to the ampli-
fication in the response of an ex-ante constrained firm. Further ongoing research
calculates the welfare gains that these periods have, for both constrained and un-
constrained firms.
These findings are important in the current debate on the design of policies
that try to mitigate the incidence of financial crisis. The imposition of capital con-
trols, or limiting the increase in the value of capital in this model, would have
an allocational effect that had been neglected so far in the literature. Therefore, a
heterogeneous agents environment in which the behavior of both constrained and
unconstrained firms is taken into account, is key to understand the implications of
this type of policies. The increase in the price of capital allows firms that are con-
strained to increase their capital stock, and in some manner undoing the effect of a
low level of financial development, at least while the pecuniary externality persists.
Taking this into account, policies that would try to address directly the sources
of the low level of financial development, and ultimately of the pervasiveness of




All balance sheet data from firms is deflated using the CPI from IFS with 2005 as
the base year.
The first step of the cleaning procedure is to exclude observations from balance
sheet data that is not consistent. Observations with negative values for balance
sheet components are excluded from the analysis.
The second step is to exclude firms with a negative Price to Book ratio or one
that is larger than 100.
The third step is to calculate variables and ratios of interest and exclude outliers
using the country specific distribution. The list of variables of interest is given in
the Data Summary tables. The procedure excludes firm-year observations that lie
above (below) the 95th percentile (5th percentile) for the country specific distribu-
tion of the variable of analysis.
Country-year aggregates from firm level data, means and medians are calcu-
lated using total assets as individual weights for observations. Country-year ob-




In this Appendix, I present the complete impulse responses for the different speci-
fications of the Panel VAR.
Figure B.1: Impulse Response: High FD (All Sample)
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of tobqdet cfkdet invkdet
Sample : if findev != 1
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps
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Figure B.2: Impulse Response: Low FD (All Sample)
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of tobqdet cfkdet invkdet
Sample : if findev == 1
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps
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Figure B.3: Impulse Response: High FD (KI Boom)
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of tobqdet cfkdet invkdet
Sample : if findev != 1 & inflow0==1
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps
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Figure B.4: Impulse Response: Low FD (KI Boom)
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of tobqdet cfkdet invkdet
Sample : if findev == 1 & inflow0==1
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps
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The solution method uses Value Function Iteration over a discretized grid for the
endogenous and the exogenous state variables. The idiosyncratic shock process
is approximated using the method of Tauchen (1986). By construction, the price
of capital in the stationary steady state is constant, and agents expectations of the
market price of capital do not play a role. Using the equilibrium policy functions
and the exogenous shock transition probability matrix, the stationary distribution
for a given interest rate and level of financial development can be derived.
The solution of the transition between steady states involves more steps, given
that the price of capital, and thus the proportion of agents that are borrowing con-
strained evolves. The algorithm used to solve for this equilibrium is given by:
1. Solve for the initial and final steady state distributions, characterized by the
solution to the stationary model, for two levels of the gross interest rate R0
and R1.
2. The economy at t = 0 is in the stationary steady state, characterized by the
distribution µ0
(
a, z; R0, K0
)
. At the end of period t = 0, the interest rate R
changes from t = 1 and stays permanently at the new level.
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3. After T periods, with T arbitrarily set but finite, the economy will settle to
the steady state consistent with the new interest rate R1. This assumption is
helpful because it permits to guess a finite sequence of the price of capital
and to use backward induction to solve the firm-household problem. The
final steady state value function will be given denoted by VT.
4. Compute the sequence of the price of capital {qt}∞t=0, from a conjectured path
of the aggregate capital {K}∞t=1, given K0.
5. Starting at t = T − 1, and using backward recursion and the conjectured
path of the price of capital, find the policy and value functions that solve the
problem given by Equations 4.12 to 4.15.
6. Given the sequence of policy functions, and starting from period 1 with the
initial distribution, the sequence of distributions {µt}
∞
t=0, the level of aggre-
gate capital and thus the market price of capital can be computed.
7. Check if the implied price of capital for t = 0, ..., T is consistent with the
pricing function conjectured by agents.
8. If not, update the sequence of aggregate capital and return to step 4.
9. Check if T is large enough by checking if the new steady state was attained
for a t < T.
100
Bibliography
Abiad, Abdul, Enrica Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel, 2010, “A New Database of
Financial Reforms,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 281–302.
Aiyagari, S. Rao, 1993, “Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving,” , No.
502.
Aoki, Kosuke, Gianluca Benigno, and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, 2009, “Capital Flows
and Asset Prices,” CEP Discussion Papers dp0921, Centre for Economic Perfor-
mance, LSE, URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/cep/cepdps/dp0921.html.
Arellano, Cristina, and Enrique Mendoza, 2002, “Credit Frictions and ’Sudden
Stops’ in Small Open Economies: An Equilibrium Business Cycle Framework
for Emerging Markets Crises,” , No. 4307.
Bayraktar, Nihal, Plutarchos Sakellaris, and Philip Vermeulen, 2005, “Real versus
financial frictions to capital investment,” , No. 566.
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine, 2009, “Financial institutions
and markets across countries and over time - data and analysis,” Policy Research
Working Paper Series 4943, The World Bank.
Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist, 1999, “The financial accelera-
tor in a quantitative business cycle framework,” in Handbook of Macroeconomics,
101
ed. by J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford, Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, chap. 21,
pp. 1341–1393 (Elsevier).
Bianchi, Javier, 2009, “Overborrowing and systemic externalities in the business
cycle,” Working Paper 2009-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Buera, Francisco J., and Benjamin Moll, 2012, “Aggregate Implications of a Credit
Crunch,” NBER Working Papers 17775, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Cardarelli, Roberto, Selim Elekdag, Ayhan Kose, Menzie Chinn, and Carlos Vegh,
2007, “Managing Large Capital Inflows,” in World Economic Outlook (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund).
Cooper, Russell, and Joao Ejarque, 2003, “Financial Frictions and Investment: Re-
quiem in Q,” Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 710–728.
Djankov, Simeon, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer, 2008, “Debt
Enforcement around the World,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 116, No. 6, pp.
1105–1149.
Eberly, Janice, Sergio Rebelo, and Nicolas Vincent, 2009, “Investment and Value: a
Neoclassical Benchmark,” Cahiers de recherche 0908, CIRPEE.
Eberly, Janice C., and Andrew B. Abel, 2004, “Q Theory Without Adjustment Costs
& Cash Flow Effects Without Financing Constraints,” , No. 205.
Epstein, Larry G., 1983, “Stationary cardinal utility and optimal growth under un-
certainty,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 133–152.
102
Fazzari, Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, Bruce C. Petersen, Alan S. Blinder, and
James M. Poterba, 1988, “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment,”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1988, No. 1, pp. pp. 141–206.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, and Gregory W Huffman, 1988, “Investment,
Capacity Utilization, and the Real Business Cycle,” American Economic Review,
Vol. 78, No. 3, pp. 402–17.
Guerrieri, Veronica, and Guido Lorenzoni, 2011, “Credit Crises, Precautionary Sav-
ings, and the Liquidity Trap,” NBER Working Papers 17583, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc, URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/17583.
html.
Harrison, Ann E., Inessa Love, and Margaret Mcmillan, 2004, “Global capital flows
and financing constraints,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp.
269–301.
Hayashi, Fumio, 1982, “Tobin’s Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Inter-
pretation,” Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 213–24.
Huggett, Mark, 1993, “The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-
insurance economies,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 17, No. 5-6,
pp. 953–969.
Jeanne, Olivier, and Anton Korinek, 2010, “Managing Credit Booms and Busts: A
Pigouvian Taxation Approach,” , No. WP10-12.
Kaplan, Steven N, and Luigi Zingales, 1997, “Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivi-
103
ties Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 169–215.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and John Moore, 1997, “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 105, No. 2, pp. 211–48.
Lorenzoni, Guido, and Karl Walentin, 2007, “Financial Frictions, Investment and
Tobin’s q,” NBER Working Papers 13092, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Inc.
Love, Inessa, 2003, “Financial Development and Financing Constraints: Interna-
tional Evidence from the Structural Investment Model,” Review of Financial Stud-
ies, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 765–791.
Love, Inessa, and Lea Zicchino, 2006, “Financial development and dynamic invest-
ment behavior: Evidence from panel VAR,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and
Finance, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 190–210.
Lucas, Robert E, and Nancy L Stokey, 1984, “Optimal growth with many con-
sumers,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 139 – 171.
Mendoza, Enrique G., 2010, “Sudden Stops, Financial Crises, and Leverage,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, Vol. 100, No. 5, pp. 1941–66.
Mendoza, Enrique G., and Marco E. Terrones, 2008, “An Anatomy Of Credit
Booms: Evidence From Macro Aggregates And Micro Data,” Working Paper
14049, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rajan, Raghuram G, and Luigi Zingales, 1998, “Financial Dependence and
Growth,” American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 559–86.
104
Reinhart, Carmen, and Vincent Reinhart, 2009, Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encom-
passing View of the Past and Present, pp. 9–62 (University of Chicago Press).
Schiantarelli, Fabio, 1996, “Financial Constraints and Investment: Methodological
Issues and International Evidence,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 12,
No. 2, pp. 70–89.
Shourideh, Ali, and Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2012, “External Financing and the Role of
Financial Frictions over the Business Cycle: Measurement and Theory,” .
Tornell, Aaron, and Frank Westermann, 2003, “Credit Market Imperfections in
Middle Income Countries,” , No. 9737.
Vegh, Carlos, forthcoming, Open Economy Macroeconomics in Developing Countries
(MIT Press).
105
